IMMIGRATION POLICY,
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
NATIONAL SECURITY

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A CMS SPECIAL REPORT
The Center for Migration Studies is an educational, nonprofit institute founded in New York in 1964 to encourage and facilitate the study of sociodemographic, economic, political, historical, legislative, and pastoral aspects of human migration and refugee movements. The opinions expressed in this work are those of the author.

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INTRODUCTION

Discussion of immigration policy in the United States is now almost entirely couched in terms of national security. However, the working links of immigration policy as stated and as enforced with national security are neither simple, nor very well understood. Among immigration policy analysts and immigration law practitioners, issues regarding law enforcement and intelligence are among the least familiar but most crucial.

To contribute to the better understanding of these links, the Center for Migration Studies, with the assistance of the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC), convened a special session on some of the key issues at its 26th Annual National Legal Conference on Immigration and Refugee Policy in Washington, D.C. on April 3, 2003.

The session was organized and moderated by Donald Kerwin, Executive Director of CLINIC; Harry “Skip” Brandon, former Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI for Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Intelligence; Vincent Cannistraro, former Chief of Operations and Analysis in the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center; and Angela Kelley, Deputy Director for Programs of the National Immigration Forum.

This report is a transcript of the session, edited only for clarity of presentation.
DONALD KERWIN

Moderator

In this session we are going to overview and analyze immigration policy changes since September 11th from a national security perspective. I wanted to start by validating the importance of this topic. In the post-9/11 world, it would be irresponsible not to engage national security issues or merely to pay lip service to them. After all, these issues affect all of us, including immigrants, who are every bit as patriotic and as concerned about safety as everybody else. It comes as no surprise, for example, that one of the first marines killed in battle in Iraq came to the United States as an unaccompanied minor. Or that 37,000 members of the United States military are Green Card holders from places like East Los Angeles and the colonias of Texas. Also, I think we should concede up front that not every immigration restriction or procedure infringes upon a core right. Of course, many do. The point is that we need to be both pro-immigrant and pro-security. But this assumes that we know which measures will make us safer. There is a broad consensus, actually, in support of certain measures. However, there have been many adopted in the name of security whose efficacy as anti-terrorist tools has been challenged.

Before I introduce our panelists, let me briefly summarize a few of the most controversial categories of restrictions since September 11th, and the anti-terror rationale that has been offered for them. First, there are a number of restrictions related to refugees, asylum seekers, and others fleeing terror and persecution. The U.S. refugee program, as you know, has been brought to a virtual standstill, largely because of security reasons. Fewer than 7,000 refugees have arrived in the first five months of this year. In Miami, asylum seekers have been criminally prosecuted for document fraud when they arrived, although, as you know, asylum seekers often cannot get valid travel documents when they are fleeing. The Department of Homeland Security recently announced that all arriving asylum seekers from 33 nations – 33 of the 60-odd nations – where Al Qaeda is present will be detained throughout the asylum process. The rationale for these restrictions is apparently the need to determine the identities of, and address any security concerns regarding, people seeking admission. In fact, few oppose these goals. And since security checks were already part of the process, this rationale does not explain these blanket measures. It also seems ironic that a war against terrorism is targeting victims of terror. A particularly confusing development is the safe-third-country asylum agreement between the United States and Canada. The agreement will require that migrants seek asylum in the first of these two countries in which they arrive. This is going to bar roughly 15,000 migrants a year from seeking asylum in Canada. How it will further security is open to question.

The second set of restrictions includes the core pieces of the anti-terror investigation: arrest and detention of more than 1,200, mostly Middle Eastern, foreign nationals; numerous detention
provisions, including expanded pre-charge detention; the special registration program that has led to the detention of more than 2,000 out-of-status persons; law enforcement interviews; and monitoring of select groups. These have been justified based on the so-called "mosaic" theory; that is, that the government needs to assemble bits and pieces of information from as many sources as possible to get a full sense of the terrorist threat. Of course, the overwhelming majority of those arrested posed no terrorist threat. And advocates have questioned why, on the one hand, the FBI has exonerated our clients – those arrested – but, on the other hand, DOJ continues to say that the fact that the detainees are not being deported, or prosecuted on national security grounds, does not mean they are not terrorists.

The third set of provisions involves secrecy: closed hearings; not identifying the names or disclosing the number in detention; not responding to FOIA requests. These measures have been based on a sort of reverse mosaic theory. The government cannot divulge information to terrorists about the sources and methods used in the investigation; we do not want them to be able to form a mosaic of the investigation. The question that arises is whether the government has overused this power and might there, in fact, be security reasons for opening hearings and adopting a more open approach.

The fourth category involves enforcement operations that target undocumented people in certain sensitive jobs – at airports, nuclear power plants and various "critical infrastructure" work sites. The national security rationale has not really been enunciated here, but it might seem self-evident that all persons who work in these industries should be suspect and should be checked out. However, an open question about these and other enforcement efforts is whether the undocumented are more likely to be Al Qaeda members than others.

The fifth set of measures involves attempts to create a so-called North American security zone by harmonizing U.S., Mexican, and Canadian immigration enforcement activities. The national security rationale here could simply be to intercept possible terrorists. Is the southern border a likely way for terrorists to enter? Another concern is whether intercepted migrants are getting refugee interviews and, if not, whether those fleeing persecution are being returned to their persecutors? Mexico now intercepts about 200,000 migrants a year with U.S. support.

Sixth, there are various provisions that do not seem to be a part of a coherent plan, or to have a coherent rationale. Last July, for example, the Department of Justice announced that the INS would begin to vigorously enforce the change-of-address law. From a law enforcement perspective, it would be helpful to know where people live. However, the hundreds of thousands of change-of-address forms that came flooding in quickly overwhelmed the INS, diverting them from other responsibilities. And the change-of-address information, as it turned out, could not be relied on anyway since it was provided on the honor system and terrorists, as we know, are not honorable.
Another example: the Department of Justice has argued in litigation that indefinitely detained Somalis must be deported to a country with no functional government because they come from a terrorist producing country and, although they were not ordered deported as terrorists, it is a risk to keep them here. The detention of Haitian boat people has also been cast as a national security issue. If you do not detain them, the argument goes, more will come, which will distract the Coast Guard from its other security responsibilities.

Apart from these types of affirmative measures, there are certain steps, which have not been taken or which are being taken far too slowly, that raise questions as well. It was reported this month in the Atlantic Monthly magazine that Saudi Arabia refused to provide passenger manifests on its flights to the United States for a year after the terrorist attack. This was regarded as a major security breach, since most of the 9/11 terrorists were Saudis. Funding for inspections of cargo and containers, which are real sources of vulnerability, also remains inadequate.

These are some of the key developments. The key questions for our panelists are: which immigration measures actually make us safer and which are simply immigration restrictions, whose wisdom we can debate, but which have nothing to do with security? Also, what immigration reform measures should advocates support? Will the pressure in support of some of the more sweeping law enforcement measures dissipate as the war on terror produces more specific intelligence about the threats we face? As a philosophical matter, if the concern is that there may be terrorists on the fringes or attempting to blend into certain communities, does it make sense to scare or to befriend those communities – as the FBI has been doing recently in various meetings and in partnership with American-Arab groups and others? Another question: given that 100 percent security is impossible to guarantee, how can the United States best manage its resources to address this risk? What is the ultimate solution to the terrorist threat?
HARRY “SKIP” BRANDON

Let me discuss some points, things that I consider to be givens. The United States, like all countries, certainly has the right to determine who enters the country and how they enter. We have the right to require noncitizens to meet certain standards for entry and standards for remaining in the United States. If non-U.S. citizens enter our country under false pretenses or illegally, we have the right to deport them or tell them to leave. Entry into the United States is not a right. We have the right and obligation to protect ourselves, and our government has the obligation to protect all of us.

But, I think, within those things that I consider to be givens, the real question is how do we go about protecting ourselves and are we in fact doing it correctly? Are we taking care of everybody and are we actually protecting ourselves by implementing the various measures Don has named? I think we all know that 9/11 has affected our country and I think we all agree that we want to be secure. But I think the real question today is whether national security needs have caused us to go too far with respect to those who want to enter the United States; have the various parts of the national security apparatus gone too far or are they using the cover of national security to address such issues as illegal immigration, regardless of the realistic threat they might pose?

I would argue that while there may have been instances of overzealous enforcement that, in balance, it seems to me that the various agencies involved have not really overstepped the boundaries we have set or have had historically. In reality, the women and men who are enforcing our laws have acted rather carefully in using some of the new powers they have been given, primarily given through the Patriot Act.

In actual practice, I think the vast majority of women and men who are on the front line do very carefully weigh our traditional protections and our Constitution while going about their jobs of trying to ensure that all of us are secure. And I do think that a lot of them, in fact, have stepped back from some of the new powers that they have, and these powers have been applied with some reason.

I want to just raise some issues and am hopeful that they will stimulate some discussion. They do not necessarily represent a point of view that I have, and they may represent a point of view some of you have. I just tried to go through randomly and frame what I think are some of the issues.

Do our national security needs allow officials to supercede the Constitution? A sub-question to that is – and it is a question that we hear all the time – are immigrants entitled to all of the rights and protections of the Constitution? Have we suspended the Constitution since 9/11 vis-à-vis immigrants? And does it make a difference, if we have suspended it, whether or not they were legal or illegal? Are all illegal immigrants, regardless of origin, threats to our national security? Can we or should we use profiling with regard to immigrants visiting from specific countries in order to protect our cit-
izens? Profiling is a hot-button word. I will tell you that "profiling" to me, in a very simple way, is effective law enforcement. What has happened is that law enforcement officers in the past – hopefully in the past – have in some cases dramatically abused their authority and under the guise of profiling, which to me means looking for logical suspects, if you will, if there has been a crime – they have basically harassed people because of their national origin. That is not profiling, that is breaking the law.

Should standards for entry vary from country of origin to country of origin? I think that is a real question. Should standards of enforcement of our laws, once people are in the United States, vary according to the country of origin of the person in question? Has our government acted with prudence in terms of post-9/11 laws and regulations and the dramatic new authority that it has been given? Has the mantra of national security been applied without reason? That may be the real question today. Are we consistent in our approach to issuing visas?

I will go back to my time in the FBI in the next couple of comments. We looked at the government as being a bit schizophrenic with regard to visa policies. We felt that many people in the State Department thought it was their mission and duty to admit people immediately, regardless of any questions about their backgrounds. At the same time, we felt that the INS thought it was their duty to keep everybody out. And this is within the same government. To go a little bit further and to give you an example from my counterintelligence days, there were people in certain countries, usually government officials, who applied for visas to the United States and there had to be background checks done on them. I recall an instance when we found that an official of another government had been declared persona non grata in another country and we had documented evidence, primarily from our good friends at CIA, that, in fact, the person was an intelligence operative. Our law says they cannot come in. We were going back and forth with the State Department, and they persisted in asking that we provide them with more of the evidence. Then, we were notified by field agents in New York that the visa was issued. It did not make any sense.

Another example – and I will have to be a little careful on this – involved the President of the United States. He had reason to meet with the head of state of another country, but the politics of the situation was such that the president of the other country did not want to come into the United States officially or as a guest of the government. It was going to be a very quiet meeting. We flew to a country in Latin America. We had FBI pilots and agents who got on a chartered plane, and went to pick him up. We came back to the United States and, because we did not want to make it appear unusual at all, we started through the regular entry process. Now this is a name that, if I said it, everyone in the room would laugh because it was very, very well-known, and, at the time, extraordinarily topical. The day before he had been issued a visa to come into the United States. We got to the
airport and INS boarded the chartered plane. Clearly, the INS officer did not recognize the name and started holding him up, saying it was suspicious, that the visa was issued just yesterday, and then started questioning and grilling, and we were getting more and more nervous. You would think he would have realized that something was going on because it was a plane full of armed FBI agents and this one person. We finally had to get the Commissioner of INS on the phone, at 10 p.m., and say, look, we are going to take off. You can chase us if you want to, but we are bringing him to Washington.

So these are two examples that I have experienced and I think are indicative of the schizophrenia that remains today. What is our government trying for? It is not consistent from one side of the government to the other. I might also mention that I sound like I am against INS – I think we all agree, it is a very difficult job, but sometimes we all do suffer. We had occasion about six months ago to try to hire a young woman from Germany. She was in the United States and had gone to work with all the work permits and everything else needed to work in the United States. Those work permits are tied to one employer, and when the company went out of business we wanted to hire her. We started the paperwork to change, not her status, but simply her sponsor. This was in September, and there was an issue because she wanted to go home for Christmas, but was in a situation where she might not be able to come back because she was no longer employed by the company who had been her sponsor. Well, innocently, trusting in our government, we filed all the paperwork. We even got an attorney to do it. There was no question that she would be approved. By December, nothing had happened, at which point it was recommended that we pay, I think, a $1,200 expedited processing fee. Four days after we paid the fee, it was approved. Now, the word “extortion” comes to mind, but again these are things we have to look at.

This leads into the real issue that I think has caused a lot of problems. Can our government actually enforce the existing immigration laws? Are we even set up to do it? With respect to refugees coming in, with new laws, we should be able to process them and we should be able to do so in an efficient manner; and I think that raises the question: can we do it, and can we be consistent in the application of the law?
VINCENT CANNISTRARO

It is clear that the country is facing a threat, a clear threat of terrorism that was vividly displayed on September 11, 2001. And beyond that there is a real fear within our law enforcement and intelligence communities that it could happen again, although not in the same form. There have been a lot of successes in the struggle against terrorists and there have been a lot of terrorist leaders who have been apprehended. A lot of intelligence has been derived from these apprehensions. But that does not mean that a group like Al Qaeda is finished. It is a self-generating group, not a secular group, many of whose members and leadership believe that they are doing God's will, and that serves as the motivation for some of its violent activities.

The United States has responded in a variety of ways. The most visible way has been in Afghanistan and in the worldwide struggle against terror, primarily abroad. In the United States, it has been the U.S. Patriot Act that has led the way in informing our responses to the possibility of terrorism in the United States. The Patriot Act gives the FBI, in particular, and I am not trying to steal Harry's thunder here, but there has been a welcome increase in the authority of the FBI to perform investigative and intelligence collection functions in the United States and I think that was welcome and necessary.

I think the major problem, however, has been our immigration policy and the acts of the United States government toward immigrants because, in many respects, what we are doing with immigrants and visa holders is counterproductive. It undercuts law enforcement, intelligence collection efforts, and overall mission. The FBI has been very sensitive to the problems of working with immigrant communities, investigating within them and making contacts within them. The vast majority of interviews that have been conducted by the FBI have been done with a degree of sensitivity and understanding that, I think, is very favorable; the same cannot be said for INS and other law enforcement.

The FBI’s mission of collecting intelligence on terrorism has been greatly expanded. Director Mueller has disseminated this new view and this new mission throughout the bureau. It has taken hold. The FBI needs to be able to collect intelligence on imminent threats in the United States. To do that, it needs to work with immigrant communities. It needs to work with people who come from countries where they have faced repression and who consequently have a great fear of authority, and of security services in particular. When we apply the blunt instrument of immigration policy and enforcement to those communities, we undercut the basis of any cooperation with the FBI and local law enforcement. What I see as the problem today is that we are using immigration policy as a proxy for law enforcement, and it is a poor proxy because it alienates the very communities that we need to
depend upon for early warning. I have always said that the problem of terrorism is one of getting intelligence, having the information that is necessary to act preemptively. If we are investigating an act of terrorism, then we have already failed, because the mission of anti-terrorism is to preempt terrorism from taking place in the first place. We need to stop it from happening because what we are talking about is human life. And if we are successful, an operation does not happen and the people are alive. If we are investigating after the fact, we have already failed. Not that I am saying we do not investigate, obviously we do, but the problem here is one of advanced knowledge and warning.

In many respects when we alienate communities, particularly immigrant communities, we undermine the very basis of our intelligence collection abilities because we need to have the trust and cooperation of people in those communities. If someone who is a stranger comes from the outside into that community, the people who are long established in that community know it or are in a position to know it, and therefore would be able to provide early warning information. But if the FBI conducts sensitive interviews with community leaders at the same time that that community members have been rounded up by INS, forced to report — and everyone who reports knows that if they are illegal, they are not a document holder, that they can and will be deported — we have really eliminated the ability to get information that we really need. I think this is the most important point to consider when looking at such enforcement activities.

There is no question that the incoherence of U.S. government policy, which was mentioned earlier, has contributed to the alienation of immigrant communities. I, too, do not mean to lean just on INS, but in the past it has been a dysfunctional agency. It has not been able to implement the laws of the United States in a coherent and consistently fair manner. That is part of the problem. But when we compound the problem, when we use INS and we use immigration policy as a way of stopping terrorism, we are really directing INS policy at certain groups and these groups tend to be profiled. And I also do not have any general problem with profiling, but I would mention that if any of these policies being conducted every day by INS had been applied by INS before September 11th, they would not have stopped the September 11th attacks. None of these people was illegal. There was one who was on a student visa, and he was not at the school that the visa was granted for. But there was nothing in the behavior of those people that would have been brought to our attention by our policies today toward immigrants. I think it is very important to note that terrorists do not necessarily advertise themselves, they do not necessarily come into the country illegally. And, as we saw with the 19 suicide bombers, none of them came in illegally. So that does not help us. What would have helped us is some kind of prior record that any of these 19 had committed a crime, had been involved with or associated with criminals. There was no information on these people before. There was one intelligence failure in the case of Khalid Almihdhar. The FBI was not told about him until very, very
late in the game. By the time they knew he was in the United States, it was too late. But that goes to the integrity of the information within the intelligence and law enforcement communities themselves, not to immigration policy.

I think that if we do not have good intelligence, we do not have good anti-terror measures because, again, intelligence is supposed to give us early warning. If we do not have early warning or if a terrorist group understands that there are flags that have come to our attention, then they are going to avoid those flags. They are not going to send people into the United States to commit terrorism who have committed acts that could have been reported by any of the world’s police forces and, indeed, none of the nineteen had criminal records. So one of the first lines of defense, the issuance of the visas in their home country, that was not a consideration. All nineteen would have, under current circumstances and profiles, been required to register. Their addresses would have been verified, they would have been entered into a tracking system, but none of them would have been prevented from entering the United States. So I think we have to be very careful when we try to use immigration as a substitute for law enforcement and intelligence and we have to be very aware that, in some cases, these two tracks are working at cross-purposes and do not help us.
ANGELA KELLEY

I am honored to be on this extraordinary panel with such great expertise. But I have to say that I am a little bit sad to be on a panel with these gentleman because it is such a comment on where we are as a nation, where our issue is, and the people that we advocate for. I want to talk a little bit about my views on the intersection of national security and immigration, about the role of advocates, and what we might think about being in favor of in order to help make a difference in the debate. It is obvious to say, and I think it is worth repeating, that September 11th has resulted in a seismic shift and it is not a temporary shift. We need to plan on September 11th causing the public to look at issues related to immigration for a very, very long time. It is obvious that the public is scared and the government seems intent on keeping us there. And the government's policies are not coming from Congress like they did in 1996 when there was debate and there were bills that could be amended. In fact, all of these policies are coming from the executive branch where neither of those things happens, where there is no Congressional oversight. And it seems that Ashcroft and his folks are remarkably brilliant and clever at finding all the provisions of the INA that I did not even know existed, and breathing life into them, and doing it in such a way that it is just wreaking havoc in the affected communities. Even with the INS moving to the Department of Homeland Security, recent indications are that Ashcroft has not given up much of his authority, that in fact he maintains authority for immigration service and enforcement. So we can look forward to his imprint remaining on immigration policy.

With respect to immigration policy, as I look back on many of the things that happened over the last 18 months and – with the exception of the effort to deputize local police officers – there has been deafening silence from the public and from Capitol Hill. If we make this debate about security and civil liberties, we will lose; it is not a debate we will win. If we use the language we used before September 11th, we will lose. The public is desperate to find a way to make us safer, and that is completely legitimate. I think it is our obligation as advocates, as experts in the field – we know immigrants, we understand how the system works – and as representatives of those folks who do not have a voice in this debate, to engage the debate. I do not mean to accept or to acquiesce to what the government is doing. We must demand policies that isolate terrorism, but do not isolate America and do not isolate America’s newcomers. That is our responsibility. We can demand it, but we have a responsibility to figure out what those policies are. The administration's policies are counterproductive. We are pushing away the very communities that we need to be embracing. We are adding hay to the hay stack by criminalizing the innocent, by collecting a lot of information on folks. Now I am not a security expert, but it does seem to me, and was confirmed earlier, that September 11th was fundamen-
tally a failure of intelligence gathering and information sharing. Immigration has a role in that, one that needs to be supportive of effective ways to prevent terrorism. Let us look at the facts. All the hijackers came in legally on nonimmigrant visas, an area of immigration law that had been ignored for a long time. Two of the hijackers had red flags – were suspected terrorists – but that information was not passed on until after they had been granted visas and it was too late to stop their legal entry. An effective system has intelligence gathering and information sharing being brought together so that the agency that collects that information shares that information with folks on the front line, with folks at ports of entry, with people who are issuing visas. They need to know who the bad guys are. And they – the consulate officers and the inspectors at ports of entry – did not know who the bad guys were. That is one important thing the Enhanced Border and Visa Security bill tried to address. The bill also talks about adding layers of security. If you think about our borders as concentric circles, our border should not be the innermost circle, but the outermost circle. We have to think of ways to make it safer for people who want to come to this country; and we need documents that are secure, so we know that the person presenting himself at the consulate, the person presenting himself at the airport, the person presenting himself at the ports of entry, is, in fact, the same person. Those really basic things have not been there. They are starting to be done as a result of the border security bill, but not yet nearly enough. So what do we need? In my view, there are three components. We need a smart border regime. We need to engage the community – a community engagement strategy. And we need comprehensive immigration reform.

A smart border regime: We need to focus on prevention and protecting our borders. That is completely legitimate. Not everyone can come in that wants to come in. We have a right to screen people, we have a right to make people prove who they say they are, and to collect basic information. In doing that, we need to use the least intrusive and the most effective methods possible. We must provide resources to our ports of entry. We need people, we need money, we need equipment, we need training. Our visa issuance, ports of entry, and watch-list systems need to be far more advanced than they have been. They are still very much in the infancy stage. Sadly, it is not an investment our government seems willing to make. What our government has done is naive. The Immigration Service got completely swallowed by the Department of Homeland Security and is constructed in such a way that services and enforcement do not talk to each other. There is no coordination, and there is not someone at the top who is accountable for how services are administered and how the enforcement policies are enforced. What that means is that we can have an inspector at a port of entry, with a refugee coming in, and that inspector at the port of entry can have two memos: one from Services that tells them what the rules and regulations and policies are for dealing with the refugee coming in, and one from Enforcement about the same thing – rules and regulations – that is completely differ-
own jobs, that over 800 police departments are accepting the consular ID card that the Mexican consulates have been issuing. Why? Because they need to know who is here, they need to know that if they pull someone over for speeding, or for drunk driving or because they need help, that they can confirm their identity. It is the local communities that are starting to take action because Washington has failed. Help us, they are saying. We need to know who these folks are. We need to offer these people status, offer them an earned legalization. As a nation, we need to make sure we know that people are who they say they are, and we need to give them a chance to belong. We can screen them, have them pay taxes, and have them become part of the American family. Bringing them into the fold, not putting them on the margins, makes sense for all involved. We also need to expand legal channels for people coming in the future. Migration happens. People come to this country. They want to come to build it. And they will continue to come. So if we have a legalization program that says “you are here as of June 15th,” guess what? On June 16th someone else is going to come illegally. And if you do not have orderly, legal channels for them to come through so they can reunite with their family members, accept the job that they have waiting for them, then they will come anyway. They will come. So let us get smart and let us set up a policy that facilitates their safe, orderly and timely entry. That way we have enforceable measures and laws that are in sync with reality. We need to do a better job of rescuing refugees. Let us stop mistreating people who are coming here to flee from some of the very bad actors that we are fighting. We cannot treat refugees as suspects without dishonoring this nation’s tradition as a beacon of hope.

So if we do this, the bitter pill we are going to have to swallow is going to be coming up with an enforcement strategy, and that is going to be a hard measure to come up with, but I think it is our obligation to do so. And I do not have the answers to it, we are all beginning just to think about it. But we can be sure that if we do not, the other side will. And if there is anybody who is having any happy thoughts about what happened on September 11th, it is the restrictionist forces. They are more powerful than ever, their numbers are growing in Congress, and they are appealing to the hearts and minds of the American public. And we cannot sit back and let them do this. If we have comprehensive immigration reform, if we engage the community, if we have a smart border regime, we will free up and focus the resources on enforcing the laws and on really stopping the bad guys and not going after the folks that are coming to build this nation. We will send a message to the communities that we need to embrace, that they belong; that they are a part of America and can add to this country’s great tradition. And finally we send a message to our allies around the world that we are not trying to harm your people, and we are not trying to send them away, and that can only help us from a foreign policy perspective. That is the America that I want to live in. This is what we have to do. This is our obligation. And I am honored and I am very happy to have each of you out here as a part of our fight.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

DK: So if you would pass your questions into the center. While we are doing this, I have a question for Mr. Brandon and Mr. Cannistraro. I wonder if they could talk a bit about what it was like in the intelligence and law enforcement communities after September 11th. I understand from having talked to them before that there was a huge dilemma. For historical reasons, the CIA had not penetrated, had not infiltrated Al Qaeda, partly due to some of the restrictions on them. And the FBI really did not have strong ties in the immigrant communities in which terrorists might blend in and were geared up to solve crimes, rather than to prevent them. That history explains some of the more sweeping immigration measures that followed. And I wonder if you could talk to that. And also talk to the question: will the pressure for such broad-based immigration measures dissipate as more targeted intelligence comes in?

HB: One of the things that I have thought about, and it relates to your last question, is as we start building our intelligence capability, and the whole community is rapidly building a pretty decent intelligence capability – and we still have a long way to go, there is no question about that – that in fact some of these issues may well go away. And that goes to something that Angela said, which is that basically we have to front load this thing. If we have good intelligence, we do not have to be going out and causing problems with immigrant communities. Now, the upside, the other side of that is that – I know from my old colleagues and it has been mentioned here – that while there was great concern about some of these concentrated efforts, going into some of these various communities after 9/11, the real thing that has happened from that has probably been positive. It has been positive in that, for the first time, the FBI is really interacting with some of these immigrant communities. And some of the communities are starting to say that. You know we talk about immigrant communities, but those are people that are here. I do not need to tell you this. Those are people who are contributing to the United States, and they do not want to be impacted by terrorism any more than those of us who are born U.S. citizens, so in fact they have a stake in this and that is what many of them have said. So, from that point of view, I think a lot of this has been positive. To my way of thinking, the real answer is to front load this, not to stop immigration, and not to shut down business.

Angela mentioned something that struck me. She said that there are 8.5 million undocumented immigrants. You know, other than some of the people who have extreme views of this, I do not think any reasonable person could point to any numbers that say that because there are 8.5 million undocumented immigrants that our economy has suffered. I mean that. When you stop and
think about it, in fact, our economy has grown and I think probably you could make a pretty good argument that we should have had different immigration policies to encourage those eight-and-a-half million workers and contributors to come to the United States because they helped build it. I don't know where I am going with this.

**DK:** You can keep going [*laughter*].

**HB:** Some of the points were made that we go back to the front loading. Maybe we do really need to revisit exactly why we have an immigration policy and what we are trying to accomplish with it. At the same time, trying to ensure that we are secure because we all want to be secure. And that goes to the right resources at the front end, so with that and the intelligence, you can see very quickly and efficiently if somebody realistically represents a threat to the United States. And if you think they do, you tell them you do not come in. If they do not, welcome them. Sorry, I forgot the whole first half.

**DK:** I guess the basic question is what was the challenge after September 11th? Will the need for broad-based measures dissipate as more specific intelligence comes in?

**VC:** It is clear that there was a real lack of intelligence prior to 9/11. Some of the reasons for this are historical. Historically – and by historical I really mean a period of about 10 or 12 years – CIA in particular, which has responsibility for collecting foreign intelligence, had been in a risk averse mode. The agency had been criticized, in some cases justly, in some cases unjustly, for having on agent rolls people who had a history of human rights abuses. There was a famous case in Guatemala, for example, in which allegedly a colonel, who had gone on the CIA payroll, may have participated in the interrogation that led to the killing of a Guatemalan rebel leader married to an American woman who made this a cause célèbre. The agency’s reaction, as is the reaction of many bureaucracies, was to pull in its horns. If we are going to get criticized for doing this, we do not need to do it. You can make a good case that CIA does not need to have a lot of Guatemalan colonels on its payroll because Guatemala is not of strategic importance to the United States. So the necessity to collect intelligence is not as strong as it might be in other areas, but those other areas are very important. And those happen to be in terrorism and in counter-narcotics as well.

If we are going to get sources that are going to provide information, it is unlikely that we are going to try to recruit anyone in this room because you cannot help. The people that can help have, by definition, blood on their hands. And that is when you get into the conundrum in the intelligence business: how many people from death squads do you want on your agent rolls? Well, up until
September 11th, you did not want any. In fact, it went through these rolls and purged all these people, even some who had committed dubious and marginal human rights abuses and the reason for this was understandable. We do not like to deal with people like this. And then if there is blowback and the agency gets criticized for it, better to forego the intelligence. If you have a penetration of a right wing death squad in Central America, for example, that person might be telling you who the next victim of that death squad is going to be, so you could stop the intended victim from being killed.

This is an example drawn from real-life experience in which we actually did have, in my time, a penetration of a death squad, but we had to pull out. And this person was telling us about plans of the death squad to assassinate the American ambassador in that country. I was ordered to pull this agent out and resettlement them in another country and the ambassador, when he heard about it, made a special trip to Washington to complain. He said: I do not want this guy pulled out. He is telling me about things that affect my life. And the director of Central Intelligence at the time said too bad. We cannot stand the heat if this is exposed because we are getting a lot of criticism about human rights abuses in Central America. So this person was pulled out. Now you could look at that two ways; one, he was pulled out because he was a political threat that affected the agency, or two, the Director of Central Intelligence did not like that ambassador [laughter].

But it does illustrate the problem of how you do this. Well, there has to be a risk-benefit equation here. What is the risk and what is the benefit? If human life is at stake, then the risks are worth taking and I think this is what it comes down to. If you want to stop people from being killed by terrorists, then you get penetration of terrorist groups. That means dealing with people with blood on their hands, something the agency seemed to favor probably only after the spur of 9/11.

HB: I just want to add one comment. You know it seems to me what we are talking about – and Vince has very eloquently described the need for intelligence – but it also applies to what we are talking about today, as Angela mentioned and I mentioned earlier, I think the thing to me that is extremely – I will use a nice word – disappointing and that absolutely astounds me is that even after 9/11, even with the increased emphasis on intelligence, the increased collection of intelligence, in this country of ours – if we want to we seem to be able to do almost anything – today, as we sit here, the people who look at whether or not somebody should be issued a visa are looking at virtually the same information they were looking at prior to September 11th. We have not fully integrated this and very honestly I do not see anybody who is pushing this. And I think that it is really ... really, it almost gets to be a misuse of intelligence. Intelligence is not worth anything if you do not use it. If you do not have access to it, and quite frankly, a lot of the people on the front lines have made as many jokes as
I have about the State Department. People sitting in the embassies really do not have an enhanced ability to fairly judge people who apply for a visa. And that is absolutely shameful. We can do these things, we can absolutely do them. We just have to have the will to do them.

DK: Do you see a security rationale in legalizing, and Skip talked a bit about this, people who come forward and are screened, undocumented people, and legalizing the future flow of people who find jobs waiting for them in the U.S.? Would a legalization program tied to security screening enhance security?

HB: I guess my comment is two part. There is kind of a double-edged sword here in a lot of ways. We have gone through an amnesty period with amnesty programs. And although many people did not take advantage of it because they just did not fully trust our government, many did. I do not think there has been any blowback from that at all. Should we offer amnesty or legalize everybody who is here? The other side of that is, when you do that....

DK: Can I interrupt? When you say blowback, do you mean no security problems as a result of that?

HB: Yeah. The other side of it is though, does that in fact just totally encourage people, many times at the risk of their own lives and we do not want that, to try to come to the United States illegally? It seems to me that you are going to have to have a more comprehensive program if you are going to do that, and that goes to re-looking, not at our two-century-old policies, but looking at what we are trying to do in the big picture. So I think you would have to have a combination of things to make that work. But as far as national security, that falling under the national security rubric, I think that falls more under the consideration, from a pragmatic standpoint, of what do we want to have in the United States and how does immigration help us, as well [as] from the human side of it. I do not see illegal immigration per se as a national security threat.

VC: I just want to add that you have to build in some kind of incentive for illegal document holders to come forward. If they report, they know what is going to happen. They can and will be deported. So, what is the incentive for them to come forth? There isn’t any. So you have to build incentives into that program.

HB: They can all get jobs at the CIA, right? [laughter]
VC: Or at your company.

DK: Did you want to talk to that, Angie, at all?

AK: No, I love their answers, this is awesome. We are adding to our quotes page.

HB: I think we are in trouble, man.

AK: Lynn, write it down.

DK: What are your thoughts about the fact that the refugee program has basically stopped since September 11th? Do you think that a terrorist is likely to try and enter the United States as a refugee?

HB: Okay, the answer is yes. And I am distinguishing clearly between an undocumented person and somebody from a refugee program because, historically, we know that governments with hostile intentions have used refugee programs to bring operatives into the United States. That is absolutely a fact. But we can operate a program like that again, and I go back to my mantra, and I do not own a computer software company, so I am not trying to sell anything, but we need to integrate intelligence with policy.

VC: What Harry says is absolutely correct. Refugee programs have been used by some countries. There is a concern, for example, that the Iraqis might have infiltrated that, although it should be said the overwhelming number of Iraqi immigrants in the United States, whether refugees or otherwise, are legitimate. They are fleeing repression, but the Iraqi intelligence service can and will use that program to get operatives into the country.

DK: So there is a need for security checks in the program?

HB: Very much so.

DK: Do you think that a national ID would in any way make our nation more secure?

VC: I am not sure that a national ID program would add anything to security whatsoever. I have a very difficult time understanding how that would happen. In effect, you have a national ID program,
it is called the social security system where everybody has a number. A national ID, so what? You could give someone a national ID and they can register and they could still go out and blow up a building the next day. It has nothing to do with anything. It all goes back to having in your database who is a terrorist and who is likely to be a terrorist.

HB: It would probably help to build the forged documents industry in the United States.

DK: Question for Angie. How do you propose to embrace and propose a national security agenda without it being co-opted by the restrictionists in Congress?

AK: Well, the restrictionists and those in Congress who are against us probably have their own agenda. They have their own agenda and have pretty powerful folks that are advancing it. So we can either sit on the sidelines or we can engage it. I think we are more than capable and able as a community to do that. The pro-immigrant community is not just us, gang. The pro-immigrant community includes business, it includes labor and civil rights groups, civil liberties, ethnic, and religious groups. It is very diverse. It's very powerful. I don't feel like I am going it alone, quite frankly. And all the factors that were lined up before September 11th, that were making the case for comprehensive immigration reform are all still there. The demographic changes — the fact that we don't have enough folks having babies, and as the mother of two I can tell you that's a lot. We need these folks. And so to me it is inevitable that we will get back to a point where we will have the discussion on the table about reforming our immigration laws and it will happen. It's a matter of when, not if. Until then, we can sit back and continue to let the administration just run roughshod over us and our communities, or we can try to engage the debate. We can bone up on what these guys have been talking about today. We can learn about what makes sense at the border and ports of entry. We need to do that. It's uncomfortable. I didn't know any of this stuff 18 months ago, and I can't even claim to know it that well now. It's really more Maurice Bellanger who knows it all, if you know the Forum. But we have to, it's our obligation. And if we don't, we can't pretend that the bad guys are not going to do it for us.

DK: This is a question that I'm going to answer. We are a Roman Catholic international religious order of women. A meeting scheduled for May in Denver involving our provincial superiors had to be relocated to Italy because two sisters from Brazil were refused visas to the United States. Two educated women who had been to Italy, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Argentina. Isn't this unreasonable? Yes. [laughter].
What criminal justice procedures could have prevented the 9/11 suicide bombers from coming in to the country? Well I guess that is intelligence, not criminal justice.

**HB:** That's right. In my mind, it's probably an esoteric distinction, but I make the distinction between criminal justice and intelligence. Although one should feed the other. Obviously, had the whole community – and Vince and I come from that community – had it been more aware of the potential for something like this, had we had the operatives and the collectors both in the United States and abroad to feed information, maybe, and that is a big maybe, 9/11 could have been prevented. A big maybe.

**VC:** I do not think there is any real answer to that. I have to concur wholeheartedly with Harry that it might have been, it might not have been prevented. We just do not know and I just do not think we will ever know. What we do know is that there were a lot of deficiencies that were recognized and not the least among those was threat analysis. What is the nature of the threat? Recognizing it. We had a lot of experience with terrorism from secular groups in the past. We had limited experience, but some experience, with religiously motivated groups. After all, Al Qaeda had blown up the American embassies in 1998 in East Africa. But we were very slow, at least in the intelligence community, in coming to the recognition that Al Qaeda was a serious threat to the United States itself, and that religiously motivated terrorism or terrorism sponsored by religious absolutists, which is probably a better definition, is distinct from the kind of terrorism promoted by radical groups in the past, secular radical groups. By and large, secular groups, with few exceptions, particularly in Sri Lanka, do not commit suicide in performing their violent acts, as we have seen Al Qaeda does. That changes the risk. That changes the equation considerably. We were very slow in coming to that.

The other part is what Harry mentioned earlier ... is the integration between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. Very slow coming, it's on the road now, but there were serious gaps, even though people had the best of intentions. But the cultures didn't merge. There is a lot of progress being made on that, particularly in the last year, and I expect a lot more progress will be made. There is no alternative. We are talking again about human life, and stopping people from killing innocents. We have got to get our act together.

**HB:** The real question was how does fidelity, integrity and bravery deal with lie, cheat and steal?

**VC:** Well!


DK: Question for Mr. Brandon. The Arab-American community reports that overall they have a good relationship with the FBI. But they experience a dynamic where the FBI tells them one thing and then DOJ does the exact opposite. They are often at odds with each other policy-wise. Any comments or ways to resolve that?

HB: No, it’s true. That’s correct. It’s not only the FBI and DOJ, it’s in a lot of parts of our government where we don’t seem to have consistent policies. It’s not necessarily driven from the top. That’s not a political statement, that’s nothing new. We don’t seem to have consistent policies driven from the top and that’s not a political statement — that’s not anything new to our government and I think you all know that. Well, I’ll be ... well, I guess I don’t have to be careful anymore.

AK: Tell us.

DK: Let me ask it in a different way. What’s Mr. Ashcroft up to? What’s he thinking?

HB: I guess what I’m seeing, and I made reference to this earlier, that I think a lot of, in this case I will speak about the FBI, but it goes far beyond that. The people on the ground, the agents on the ground, seemed to have really understood what the issues are and I think acted properly with very few exceptions. Acted appropriately, and I’m not saying that the Attorney General is saying they should be inappropriate at all, but almost, they kind of stayed with what they had grown up with, which was enforcing the law and respect for the Constitution. I may be waving the flag a bit, but most of them are very, very sensitive about that and very aware of it. Basically, they went about their business in the best way possible. That doesn’t answer the question: is there a disconnect? We shouldn’t have to depend on good people to make it work. There continues to be a disconnect. There shouldn’t be a disconnect. I don’t know how to answer that, I just don’t know.

VC: Yeah, there is a disconnect and I’ve had some recent, practical experience in this. By and large, when raids are carried out, for example, against suspect organizations, these are comprised of joint task forces. FBI may be present, but the lead agency might be Customs, for example. And invariably, when these raids are carried out — say Customs is in charge of a particular raid as the lead agency — talking to people after — who have been raided — talking to them about their impressions of how they were treated, invariably they praise the FBI. Invariably, they condemn Customs. I’m serious Harry. There is a tradition, I think, with the Bureau being much more sensitive to this. I don’t know whether this dates from the early years or the later years, but certainly in my recent experience they
have conducted these raids, by and large, with a great deal of sensitivity and that cannot be said for some of the other organizations, unfortunately.

We're coming very late to it, with limited understanding, not a very well-grounded international background, understanding the environment. And many times they are under instructions from their parent organizations to carry out actions which undercut the actions of other agencies in terms of collecting information.

**HB:** You pretty well danced all around that question. That's a hard one.

**DK:** Let me ask this. I don't know if you can answer this, maybe the both of you can answer this since you have retired. Do you have a sense that on the level of CIA or FBI director or Attorney General that there are disagreements on how to prosecute the war on terror? Disagreements over some of these provisions, some of things that have happened?

**HB:** I think he was asking you, Vince [laughter].

**VC:** I think there is a very strong confluence of agreement between Director Mueller and Director Tenet. I do not think there is any real daylight between those two. Whether there is daylight between Tenet and Ashcroft, or between Mueller and Ashcroft, I can only speculate. My feeling is that, more generally – not those two gentlemen because I cannot speak for either one of them – but more generally in the community there is a lot of questioning of Ashcroft’s methods and policies. I know some agents in the field that have been affected by Department of Justice policy decisions that they do not agree with, yet are being forced to carry out. Some of them believe, as I mentioned in my prepared remarks, that these policies are counterproductive.

**HB:** I think historically, there has been a – and quite frankly I think an entirely proper and appropriate – separation with the Attorney General being a political appointee and carrying out the will of the president, whereas the FBI and CIA have been basically professional organizations in theory, not subject – hopefully not subject at least as much – to politics and what the idea of the day is. I would say it's not an immigration issue. The director of the FBI is, and many of you may not know this, an appointment for a ten-year period and it was intended to be that way because the idea is that it would span, it would not be a political appointment per se, that it would not be one that would change with every administration. I strongly think that the head of the CIA should be exactly the same kind of appointment. Although I do not think the head of the CIA has been as political as
ous Cabinet-level employees. I would advocate that just to further remove him from any undue influence from political agendas.

**DK:** What do you recommend that immigration advocates do to get out the word that these immigration measures do not help security? Any advice on how we change the debate because we are losing currently? I should say that one of things we are very grateful for is you being here today to work through these issues with us.

**VC:** That is what I would say. Continue to have these types of conferences and seminars and keep addressing these issues and getting them disseminated.

**DK:** Will you keep coming? *laughter*

**HB:** If I might, and I know you must be doing this, but it strikes me that this becomes not only a kind of a bottom part of the triangle issue, or grassroots is the phrase I guess you would use, but it also has to come from the top down. I think it really has to come from the top down. People need to be made aware of what the real issues are and what some of the solutions are. And maybe, I don’t know if you don’t do this, but I like some of the things you said. You just did not raise issues, you had answers. And that is very positive. If you can go to a Congressman or a Senator and say here is an issue and here is a very reasonable answer, that makes it real easy for them. They like no-brainers.

**DK:** With the war in Iraq, the FBI has begun to interview Iraqis in the U.S. in an effort to prevent retaliatory terrorist acts in the United States, as well as to inform them that the FBI will investigate any hate crimes against them. Is this a helpful resource for intelligence gathering, why or why not? Please comment as well on the FBI’s new ability to detain people on immigration violations.

**HB:** I think it’s an appropriate and good use of FBI resources if done the correct way. And every indication, as we said earlier is that it is being done in the proper manner. This is a two-prong, at a minimum, program, with one that you have mentioned not being given a lot of publicity. It can serve as a preventative program. It’s highly likely, as Vince mentioned earlier, that Iraq has Iraqi intelligence agents and operatives in the United States. They are going to be part of these communities so they do not stand out. And so by doing this, even if you don’t identify them, what you’re doing is sending a message that somebody is looking. It may very well be a preventive program, and we live in a time in which prevention is absolutely the name of the game. And so that’s part of it. The other side of it is
learning about the community and looking down the road because this will go on for a while so that is a very positive thing. What was the other part?

DK: The other was the question about what do you think about the FBI's new detention powers? Arresting people and detaining them on immigration violations?

HB: Well, I always thought they had quite a bit to do before.

DK: Does that mean the FBI getting involved in pursuit of people for immigration violations? Is that what we are talking about?

HB: That is not the way I understand it. But I think it's more along the lines of when they are interviewing somebody who is undocumented, then they find that they are in violation of U.S. law, they have the authority to detain them. Of course, we kind of go to the issue that Vince raised earlier is that really what you want to do, and that's a whole different issue.

VC: There is one thing that should be added in there. There is a lot of feeling amongst many communities, particularly Arab and Muslim communities, that they are subject to hate crimes. One advantage of these interviews, and the Bureau's been very good about it – do I get paid for praising the Bureau? – the Bureau is very prompt to follow up on reports of hate crimes, whether they are against Iraqi immigrants, Iraqi-American citizens, or anyone else. This is one of the ways for these communities to get back to the Bureau what they are feeling and how they feel they are being targeted in the United States.

DK: How do we ensure that people who get on police or security watch lists inappropriately have an effective way of getting off these lists? These things can and will destroy lives. Should there be some kind of non-law-enforcement oversight?

HB: That is an interesting thought, the thought of non-law-enforcement oversight. It probably would be pretty healthy. Now that I am a civilian and in business we have had this come up with one case from a Gulf state. A very, very well-known, prominent businessman, because of some problems with the transliteration of names, Arabic names, popped up on about his twelfth or thirteenth visit to the United States as, you know, a huge terrorist. You know we are still working with him trying to get this cleared out. He has not been back since then. And if you really want to be very pragmatic, the
United States has lost business because of that. So, it's a problem. I don't have the answer – obviously you can say thorough vetting, more scrubbing, some sort of process. But unfortunately, based on past practices, probably some type of an outside overview or oversight might be a good idea.

VC: I certainly agree with that. The problem is the quality of the data that goes in to put someone on a watch list. And unfortunately, garbage in, garbage out. That still applies here. Unfortunately in the world of terror suspects, it is an overwhelming role.

DK: What do you think about the value of tipster ads on the interstate?

VC: Okay, let me address that. Since I just called a tip in, or someone turned me in, something [laughter]. Look, I think that is a two-edged sword. I mean, you want people like early responders, first responders, and law enforcement to be aware of suspicious activities at critical sites, nuclear plants. No one is going to argue with someone saying there is this guy sitting across from the Crystal River nuclear plant and he's making little sketches, etc. Is that making a tip? But do you really want mailmen and service employees being tipsters and calling them in? That is just a recipe, not just for vigilantism, but for hysteria. It is a horrible, horrible idea. But I think part of it is a good idea if you have qualified people calling in tips around suspicious areas. Making everyone a spy and spying on the neighbor I think is probably a horrible idea.

HB: Sounds good to me.

DK: We're going to do two more because we are reaching the end here. How confident are you about the upcoming work of the commission set up to investigate the intelligence shortcomings surrounding 9/11? Will this commission have integrity?

HB: I think based on the people that have been appointed to the commission it strikes me that the individuals chosen have high integrity. My impression is that they are very serious about what their task is. The question will come, I guess, if they are given the resources and allowed to do the job. There was a lot of resistance to yet another group looking at what happened on 9/11. It's my way of thinking, and Vince has touched on this, it is not rocket science that we did not have the resources out there or the people out there to prevent it. It just was not there. I can answer that right now, I don't know whether we need to have a commission. I think if you want to be practical about it, they will probably do their job. Because I can't imagine anyone willing to take the heat for shutting them down.
VC: Yeah, I just have an unorthodox view. The commission, while comprised of serious, well-intentioned people, is not going to be productive in providing some real answers to these questions. Like Harry said, we know what the answers are. We didn't have the intelligence resources.

HB: All of us would like to be able to say: here's the answer and here's how to fix it. It's just not that easy, it's just not that easy.

DK: Let me ask this as a last question and also offer to all of you, if you would like, the opportunity to make closing remarks. And this is a general question. What would the FBI and CIA like to see as far as immigration policies that would legitimately serve counterterrorism? And anything else you want to say, because we are kind of up against 11 a.m here, when our next panel starts.

VC: I think it's the recognition that we need a coherent policy and that means integrating the policies and practices of INS with law enforcement in a way that they don't undermine each other. And more particularly, that they don't undermine the very serious efforts of the FBI, which tries to collect intelligence on terrorist threats in America. I'm just afraid that our practices really do undermine that effort. We are alienating the very communities that we need to depend on for early warning.

HB: The only thing I would add to this, and I'm not sure it quite goes to the question, it seems to me that an immigration policy should be pushed to the forefront of the national agenda instead of something that pops up when there is a real problem or a horror story. This is critical, and that does involve fully integrating intelligence into whatever they decide the policy is going to be, to be able to do it reasonably, not to get back to you in twelve months and I hope we can find your paperwork.

DK: Angie, what about immigration reform as a national security priority?

AK: Well, I think a couple of thoughts. It has been very difficult the last 18 months. We've all had a hard time coming to grips with what has happened. I think the barrage and waves of edict after edict by the Department of Justice and the effects that it has had on the economy has left us all profoundly exhausted. We have to respond to those policy changes. We have to deal with the aftermath. We have to deal with the press calls and we have to deal with the client lines and the reality of what folks are going through. The challenge is to go forward and have a plan and a goal. And the plan has to be how we engage this debate, how we can talk about a smart borders regime, how we can look at the successful efforts of ADC in Dearborn, Michigan, who has partnered with the FBI to engage the com-
munity and how we can reform our immigration laws. That's got to be the goal at the end of the day, that we make it so that people who are coming here to build this nation have a clear path to citizenship. So we make it so that we rescue refugees who were fleeing persecution, so we ensure our nation's economic security to have enough people to come to this country to fill jobs that would otherwise not be filled, and that we make this a safer nation. Those are the goals, and we have to come up with a plan to do it. It's our obligation as advocates and the ones who really know about how this stuff happens, we know how it works on the ground and, no disrespect to anyone, but they don't know. They are the right messengers, but we are the thinkers behind it and it is marrying up these two pieces that is our job. Thanks.

DK: We are going to end on that note. How about we thank the panel because they did a great job?

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