MIGRATION AND WORLD POLITICS:
A CRITICAL CASE FOR THEORY AND POLICY

By
Mark J. Miller
and
Robert A. Denemark

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ABSTRACT

The study of international migration does not fit neatly into any particular disciplinary home. As a result, theories developed in the major branches of the social sciences are not systematically applied to help guide work on migration, nor is the phenomenon of migration used systematically to help evaluate or further develop those theories. This work asks how theories of international relations have apprehended global migration. The five major contemporary approaches to international relations are reviewed and evaluated relative to their abilities to comprehend migration, particularly in Europe. A number of theories provide insights into the phenomenon, though we find world system theory takes us the farthest. Four categories of suggestions for migration research and policy follow from our theoretical assessment.
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X
INTRODUCTION

A sudden confluence of events has thrust international migration into the limelight of world politics. It seems that every news item from far-away places involves international migration in some shape or form. The topic figured on the G-7 agenda at the 1991 annual meeting of the heads of state of the most powerful industrial democracies, and seems never to have been far from center stage since. For those whose task it has been to keep abreast of international migration developments and to understand them, the last few years have been challenging indeed and there is no respite in sight. It is no longer possible for individual scholars to impose intellectual order on the raw information available on the subject.

The new salience of international migration issues comes on the heels of a decade or more in which academic and government-sponsored studies of international migration multiplied enormously. Peter O'Brien (1988:108-9) has documented this migration studies "growth industry" in Germany. There has been a tremendous upsurge in scholarly research and writing on international migration over the last decade and a half in France, the US, Canada, and Australia as well. This combination of the proliferation of international migration scholarship, the new salience attached to it in international relations, and the near certainty that international migration issues will become more rather than less important and complex in coming decades, raises a familiar question. Is there a theory or a body of theoretical work that can help one make sense out of the raw data on international migration bombarding us from the four corners of the world? Is there a theory that a scholar could turn to in order to grasp the future contours of international migration in what Stanley Hoffman might refer to as the new world disorder?

Study of international migration perhaps constitutes the interdisciplinary field par excellence. The many and varied academic disciplines involved in international migration studies bring to the subject matter particular theoretical concerns which may or may not be of broader interest. But there is no single, generally accepted theory of international migration. At best, there are competing theories of international migration which come from a variety of disciplines and a mix of ontologies (Boehning, 1984). Aristide Zolberg (1989) notes the "... many differences... attributable to different intellectual traditions and disciplinary backgrounds..." The result can look very much like a monumental theoretical muddle.
I. THEORIES OF MIGRATION

Castles and Miller (1993) have recently analyzed the evolution of migration theory in great detail. They view the geographer Ravenstein's (1885; 1889) efforts to formulate statistical laws of migration as the earliest systematic approach. However this work was disconnected from any empirical observations.

More contemporary ideas of migration are presented in what are commonly known as 'push-pull' theories. 'Push factors', such as overcrowding, poverty, and lack of economic opportunities or political liberties, team with 'pull factors', such as abundant land, high rates of employment and standards of living, and political liberties, to explain migration. Such a model has roots deep within the neo-classical liberal school, and shares many of its problems. It is ahistorical, suggesting that the demand for migration should be constant when these discrepancies exist. This has not been the case. It is individualistic, suggesting that the critical decisions are made in an atomistic atmosphere. Yet actual patterns of migration are greatly affected by a variety of cultural and historical factors. The state and its regulation are viewed as aberrations which disrupt the functioning of markets that would otherwise quickly and easily equilibrate.

Yet the solutions offered (e.g. by Borjas, 1990) that migration rights simply be sold to the highest bidders simply constitute an alternative form of regulation that belies any actual faith in pure market mechanisms. Although highly influential in post-cold war policy making circles, as witnessed by the adoption of the Immigration Act of 1990 by the United States, and by arguments surrounding important NAFTA proposals, neo-classical liberal approaches are viewed as simplistic. They cannot account for the spatial or the temporal flow of past immigrants, nor are they of much help in predicting future migrations.

Castles and Miller argue that no simplistic attribution of cause can ever explain why people move internationally. Each migratory movement in embedded in specific historical circumstances, but one can generalize about the way in which migrations evolve and about certain dynamics in the process. Like Fawcett and Arnold (1987) and Kritz et. al. (1992), migrations would appear to be best understood through the conceptual framework of a "migration system," referring to a set of places linked by conditions that lead to flows and counterflows of people. Castles and Miller propose that each specific migratory movement can be viewed as the result of interacting macro- and micro-structures, the former including factors related
to the functioning of the global political economy and specific state policies, while the latter embraces networks and the beliefs and practices of migrants themselves. Macro and micro-structures are linked at all levels and are facets of an overarching migratory process. It is in the context of notions like this, being developed by migration specialists, that theories of world politics can help.

II. THEORIES OF WORLD POLITICS

What do theories of international relations have to offer? International relations has an extremely rich and extensive tradition of theorizing. International migration, however, has never figured prominently in the effort to think abstractly and to conceptualize international relations. Although as prominent a theorist as Raymond Aron (1964) noted the phenomenon, he does not identify it as particularly important. Indeed, students of world politics and international relations have paid scant attention to migration until just recently. A scholar or a practitioner will find relatively little theory in the plethora of tomes on world politics and international relations that directly addresses international migration.

This gap affords us two opportunities. First, a study of the evolution of international migration will have something to say about theories of international relations. International migration is a major global phenomenon, and the relative ability of theories to help us understand where we have been and where we appear to be going will suggest something about a theory’s ability to help us comprehend and predict important global phenomena in general. Second, if pieces of the literature in international relations theory are able to help us comprehend international migration, then such theories can be further mined in order to help explain what will likely be the empirical and policy contours of international migration in the future.

We will outline the five major theories of international relations that currently vie for the attention of scholars in the field. This summary will not be a systematic review of all that the theories involve, but will instead focus on basic propositions and essential attributes especially as they might be relevant to the issue of global migration. We will then review developments in the field of migration, primarily in post-war Western Europe, to see which of these theories is capable of informing us about this very important international phenomenon. Finally, we will venture some suggestions regarding the future of migration
based upon our understanding of those insights that appear most relevant.

Realism

Realism was the first of the modern theories to appear, building itself on the delegitimation of idealism in the wake of the carnage of the Second World War. Hans Morgenthau (1948) produced the keynote work, describing realism in terms of six principles. First, there exist objective laws of society and politics grounded in immutable human nature. Second, politics constitutes a sphere of social relations that must be understood in terms of the search for power. Third, power is contextual in nature. Forth, universal moral principles are inapplicable in the realm of state behavior. Fifth, no single set of moral aspirations offered by one nation can be identifiable with the moral laws "that govern the universe." Finally, the political sphere is an autonomous one, separable from all other spheres of human interaction.

A number of other attributes derive from these principles or have simply evolved within the realist paradigm. From the realist perspective, the nation-state is the fundamental unit of analysis, and other units, derived as they often are from universalist or moralist leanings, are to be considered ephemeral at best. Juridically equal and dedicated to the pursuit of their own interests, the global system of nation-states is anarchic. Realists posit a Hobbesian world, and the structure of the global system at any given point in time is a function of the independent and always potentially hostile actions of existing national states. The search for security that emerges in such a context drives states into a balance of power system where the passions and the interests of each can be offset by those of others in hopes of averting self-destruction and supporting the status quo.

Systems of understanding that claim to be based on an immutable bedrock of human nature are ill-equipped to deal with the concept of change. Realism concerns itself with the changing of the relative levels of power among actors, and with the transition from peace to war. Technological innovation, particularly as regards armaments, and population dynamics, appear to be the prime internal elements of change. More crucially, alliance politics within the context of a balance of power system may be used to offset internal changes and mediate the onset of violence. The fundamental nature of international relations, grounded in the principles Morgenthau expounded, may suffer a "change" in the identity of
relevant actors, but does not "evolve."

Interdependence

In the late 1960s and 1970s students of international relations engaged in a debate over the assumptions that underpin realism. Those with a behavioralist bent took the perspective to task for its unscientific nature. Realism was said to suffer from un or under-specified central concepts, and the claims of realism's proponents that it derives from an immutable human nature gave rise to charges of tautology. On the substantive plain, the vision of an anarchic world of unified, rational nation-states all seeking power in an autonomous political sphere grew increasingly contrary to the reality many scholars of international relations and foreign policy saw.

While the behavioral critique remains an important one, it was the liberal literature that provided the most direct assault on the substantive claims of the realists. Liberal students of the domestic political system view the state as an arena within which interest groups contend. Contention does not necessarily end with the initiation of a policy, nor does it necessarily abate after an issue extends itself beyond the water's edge. As a result, it is difficult to accept the idea of a "unified rational" nation-state.

Extending the liberal perspective into global politics, the primary unit of analysis becomes not the nation-state itself but the international issue area in question. Each issue area differs in terms of the nation-states or subgroups that will be involved, as well as the elements of power that will be relevant or applicable. The context within which these issues will be framed may be called "international regimes" defined as the "networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects" (Keohane and Nye, 1977:19). Each regime differs in terms of its "structure," (the distribution of power that can be brought to bear by those involved), and the "processes" (specific "allocative or bargaining behavior") involved. Power resources are translated into control over outcomes by varying linkage strategies, by agenda setting behaviors, by transnational and transgovernmental relations, and by the actions of international organizations.

Although some changes in the global system will be easily traceable to changing economic forces and
overall national power, these are not usually sufficient. As political actors can intervene to alter the effects of broad economic changes, and as power resources may be issue specific, such models are often inadequate. Change is more likely to be apprehended in issue specific terms and with reference to differences in the ability of particular actors to attend and bring resources to bear upon a particular issue.

More to the point is the question of how one achieves cooperation under such constraints. Conceiving of the problem in game theoretic terms, the question becomes one of allowing for the acquisition of joint gains by reducing the fear of cheating by the sovereign actors in any given situation. (This is thought to be the key problem posed by the anarchy of the system.) Making sure that the actors involved see the chances for joint gains is usually identified as a major part of the solution.

As a last resort, the presence or absence of change might also be understood with reference to the sum total of rules or norms present in the global system. Actions taken that reflect changes in the distribution of power relevant to a specific issue will be easier to achieve. Those changes sought that may be contrary to the distribution will be difficult to achieve or maintain. Such changes can also be nullified by resort to arms. But the increasing costs and declining utility of doing so make liberal explanations of change more relevant in a world of increasing interdependence.

**Neo-Realism**

In the early 1980s James Oliver and Richard Ashley leveled some serious charges at the liberal international relations theorists. Oliver (1982) noted that there was not nearly as much of a difference between international relations as conceived by the liberals Keohane and Nye and by the realists they sought to criticize as many were suggesting. Ashley (1984) went further. He argued that the liberal mainstream of the field was actually moving back toward realism, though realism of a decidedly inferior type. Gone were the pronouncements about human nature and the hamhanded attention to and reliance upon military force. But conceptions of anarchy, of the nation-state as the central actor in global politics, of the search for security and stability, (albeit security and stability of a slightly more collective a nature), and of power more traditionally defined, were all back in force.

Ashley argued that in place of the original realism, we now found a school of thought that was
particularly dismal, ahistorical, and shallow in nature. Gone was the careful attention to historical context that was the hallmark of realist works like Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. Gone too was any hope of facilitating international cooperation by clearing the way for the acquisition of joint gains. For the more contemporary "neo-realist," the liberal interpretation of the cooperation problem is flawed by its emphasis on joint gains. In this Hobbesian world, relative gains are far more relevant than simple absolute gains. Unequal gains could alter the balance of power and reduce the viability of actors in the system. The cheating possible in an anarchic world is therefore not the central problem. The real impediment to international cooperation rests with the allegedly universal desire to conclude agreements that are inequitably favorable to only one party (Grieco, 1990). As each party desires greater gains than the other, agreements will be difficult to reach and maintain.

Neo-realism also brought with it a different vision of the state system. Instead of the actions of individual states creating the structure of the system, the "system" is conceived as being more autonomous. From this perspective, an international "structure" emerges which is based on the existing distribution of nation-states with varying degrees of power. This structure provides the incentives with which nation-states contend. As a result, "change" implies more than a simple alteration in the identity or relative position of a given set of actors, as it does for realists. Since the "structure" of the system is less dependent on the position of any single actor, the system is not particularly vulnerable to change. Yet change is seen as taking place.

The primary agent of change in the neo-realist school is the dynamic of hegemonic rise and decline. Here a dominant power emerges and establishes most of the salient rules of the system. As that dominance breaks down under both internal and external pressures, regimes break down and we see periods of instability (Gilpin, 1987:72-80). Change is a function of the alteration of the global "system" given the rhythm of the rise and decline of hegemonic power.

**Marxism**

The radical critique that Ashley went on to level at the neo-realists was based at least in part on a Marxian interpretation of politics. Though Marxism is one of the major schools of thought that vie for the
attention of students of world politics, the relationship between Marxism and world politics has always been problematic. Marx sought to delineate the processes by which history progresses. Breaking with mercantilist and liberal ideas, he identified production as the most fundamental social dynamic. This rejection of the more traditional focus upon governments and markets led away from any significant consideration of "international" exchange between actors. For most intents and purposes, Marx assumed a closed economy (Bowles, 1988). By drawing our attention to production, exploitation, and alienation, Marx creates an analytical method with a specifically national character. This national character is supported by Marx's adoption of classes as the fundamental units of analysis. Classes are differentiated from one another by their relationship to an essentially national stock of the means of production. Dominant classes, while not always unitary, nonetheless dominate the apparatus of the state.

Vigorous debates in Marxist circles over the relative "autonomy" of the state do not detract in the least from this predisposition (Carnoy, 1984). Those who argue that states act as the wholly subordinate "executive committee of the bourgeoisie" and those who imbue the state with a healthy degree of relative autonomy both assume a state of an oft unified and quite rational nature. The capacity to either mirror class interests entirely or protect class factions from potentially destructive short-term behaviors requires a highly efficacious state apparatus.

Class interaction was not viewed by Marx as taking place in a vacuum. Its nature was determined by the operative mode of production. A mode of production is born in the marriage between the means of production, (a set of essentially the physical and technical requisites), and the social relations of production, (the patterns of human interaction that evolve around a given set of physical and technical conditions). Note once again that these are essentially national attributes.

For Marx, social reality was conditioned by the production of commodities and the accumulation of capital. In the era of the capitalist mode of production this entailed the creation of a class of wage laborers forced to sell their labor power to a class of capitalists who owned the means of production. Surplus value was wrung from the workers as the value of the goods they produced exceeded the extent of the wages they received. The dominant classes and the state they controlled acted to assure this exploitation by
adopter policies designed to keep labor ever in the subordinante position.

Possibly the most seductive facet of Marx's work rests not in his ability to explain society in any given period, but in his ability to explain change. Marx's adoption of the dialectical method and of a materialist framework allowed him to identify contradictions inherent in the various modes of production that had existed historically. Within each mode lay the seeds of its own destruction. In the capitalist mode, the nature of exploitation, the tendency for the rate of profit to decline, and the concomitant shrinking of the capitalist class relative to the mass of impoverished workers would eventually doom the system. Marx added teeth to this assertion by identifying previous modes of production and the contradictions that gave rise to revolutions and subsequent formations in a comprehensive and theoretically powerful manner. Again, however, these modes of production and the contradictions that spell their eventual demise are national level phenomena. Though they might generalize across national experiences, their dynamics were essentially internal.

Marx wrote significantly on only one important international phenomena: the propensity of capitalism to expand. Luxembourg, Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin would all make important contributions to this analysis, but global level relations would remain peripheral to the mainstream of Marxist literature (Bowles, 1988:433-4). The difficulties of doing serious Marxist research in the west, together with the adoption within Soviet international relations circles of what may only be described as the realist paradigm, kept the level of discourse in this area relatively underdeveloped for many years.

Dependency and World System

This began to change slowly in the 1960s. The works of Paul Baran (1960), Andre Gunder Frank (1967; 1968; 1974), Samir Amin (1973) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) gained in popularity, largely as a result of the failure of traditional perspectives, Marxian or not, to shed any real light on conditions in peripheral areas. Dealing with the periphery meant dealing with the recipients of imperialism. Marx spoke of imperialism's destructive and regenerative elements. The west was to bring capitalism to the rest of the world. That was both awful and, it was hoped, progressive. But scholars in the 1960s noted something amiss. Instead of creating small models of what had gone on in early modern Europe,
imperialism seemed to implant a whole new set of forces in the areas the west had settled. These forces seemed to stand squarely in the way of the kind of progress Marx predicted. While this set of scholars tried to remain consistent with Marx's spirit, their conclusions were tailored to the conditions they found in small open economies dominated by external forces. More orthodox Marxist scholars rejected both the methods and the conclusions of this group, and a bitter academic debate developed (See Warren, 1980; Taylor, 1979; and Brenner, 1977).

Resnick, Sinisi, and Wolff (1985) attempt to differentiate between Marxism, and what may be termed the "radical school." The direct extraction and distribution of surplus labor (fundamental and subsumed class processes respectively), are identified as the core of any truly Marxist analysis. A foreign entity must be the first recipient of surplus value extracted to be considered a participant in any "fundamental class process" with a legitimately international dimension. Hence if a transnational corporation owned by core state nationals opens a subsidiary in a peripheral area and allows that subsidiary to be locally managed, surplus value extracted is not to be considered a form of foreign exploitation. If the second receivers of the surplus value extracted are foreign, then there is some "subsumed class process" at work which involves international relations. If for any reason the surplus value extracted is not received in the first or the second instance by non-nationals, (as in the case of portfolio investment, technology lease agreements, or political/military intervention to affect market conditions), then non-class processes are said to be a work and the problem falls outside the purview of Marxist analysis.

Clearly much of interest to students of international relations must be considered outside of the parameters of Marxism from this perspective. The ideas of these "radical" scholars first coalesced under the rubric of "dependency" theory. The fundamental insight offered by the dependency scholars concerned the unity of the concepts of development and underdevelopment. In response to prevailing orthodoxies in economics, sociology and comparative politics, proponents of dependency argued that "development" and "underdevelopment" were simply two sides of the same coin. Conditions in peripheral countries could not be understood without considering the context within which these countries were integrated into the global system. Relations of trade, international investment, and in some cases the use of force in the
international realm had to be comprehended if any real understanding of the periphery was to be gained.

Dependency evolved into the world system literature when scholars began to consider both peripheral and non-peripheral relations (Frank, 1978; Wallerstein, 1974). For world system scholars, the only legitimate unit of analysis is the world system itself. It is at this macro level that the context within which actions emerge is established.

The modern world system is made up of a global division of labor and a state system (Chase-Dunn, 1986). The system itself is driven by the requisites of accumulation of a global level, and manifests itself in terms of three fundamental structures. The core-periphery hierarchy is the first. The interaction of various areas allow for the creation of a complex global division of labor within which some come to specialize in goods with a high level of technology and value-added, while others are left to provide raw materials. The role of the state is fundamental to this differentiation. Once established, the world system is characterized by a small core, a large periphery, and a small semi-periphery made up of the occasional declining core state and peripheral states that come undergo dramatic growth. This differentiation of the world system into core, periphery and semi-periphery is a primary facet of international relations.

The second is a set of long economic cycles. Drawing on the early literature of Kondratieff (1935), these long cycles provide a pulse of approximately 50 years of upswing and downswing. The genesis of these cycles is a topic of constant debate, but their effects in a variety of areas, including regime change and global debt crises (to name but two that might be most relevant for migration) make up a significant portion of the world system literature. Immanuel Wallerstein, one of the major world system proponents, adds to this cyclical nature a set of secular trends as well. These include physical expansion, commodification, and mechanization (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1981). The secular trends have natural limits, and the cyclical rhythms may amplify over the long term. Change of an epochal nature is suggested to occur when a confluence of these limits to existing secular trends, and a major cyclical economic downturn, result in upheaval and transformation. This is the process that was suggested to have occurred in the late 15th century when the feudal system, weakened by its internal contradictions and pressured externally as well, gave way and ushered in the development of capitalism during the "long 16th century"
The third fundamental differentiation concerns inter-core rivalry. Periods of hegemony are said to alternate with periods of rivalry (lack of hegemony) in some as yet not fully specified relationship to the economic cycles posited. Wars are more likely to emerge during periods of rivalry, while colonial conquest or great power intervention characterizes global violence in hegemonic eras.

A healthy debate has emerged within the world system school regarding the specifically "modern" nature of these dynamics. Some scholars are now questioning whether these processes are actually specific to the era of "capitalism" or whether they are historical constants that should allow us to search for clues to the functioning of the world system in the years prior to the 16th century as well (Frank, 1990).

III. THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT

International migration probably qualified as the most humanly intensive transnational phenomenon even back in the 1970s. No one knows for sure how many international migrants there were then, although estimates were made and they ran into the tens of millions. In 1992 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated the world’s recent migrant population at 100 million people (IOM, 1992).

The focus of many studies of international migration back in the 1960s and 1970s was upon Western Europe. Perhaps one of the reasons why many analysts did not fully grasp the socio-economic and political significance of international migration at that point was the prevailing belief that the migratory phenomenon was ephemeral. Until the mid-1970s, Western European policies generally were posited on the assumption that most migrants would return home. Virtually no one foresaw the extensiveness of settlement that would occur. And even when settlement became an incontrovertible fact, a number of states would persist in not acknowledging it. The myth of return is with us still today.
Migration and Realism:
Revisiting the Demise of the Nation-State

Underneath the veneer of no longer credible post-war migration policies, specifically guestworker and seasonal worker policies, was a mushrooming socio-economic and political reality that was linking migrant sending and receiving societies in multifaceted and, over the long run, extremely significant ways. Immigrant wage remittances became major sources of income for entire regions in the countries of emigration and industries in the lands of immigration could no longer function without immigrant labor. There were belated attempts to enforce return or to stop family reunification but these generally failed. The migration linkage between states like Germany and Turkey had begun purposively as the German government authorized foreign labor recruitment for conjectural labor market purposes. And, Germany and Turkey were NATO allies. But international migration between Germany and Turkey had attained a certain autonomy making it increasingly difficult for the German and Turkish governments to regulate or control it by the 1970s.

It was the feeling that immigration had gotten out of control and a mounting socio-political malaise over integration issues that prompted the European decisions to curb further labor recruitment by 1974. These decisions were unilateral on the part of Western European states and they were seen by some as possibly reducing immigrant populations. Those hopes were proven largely illusory due to family reunification and births to resident aliens in Western Europe. Western European states were constrained by legal, democratic, foreign policy and human rights considerations to permit legally-authorized settlement to continue. Relatively few resident aliens were forced to return home against their will. Massive repatriation would have wrought economic havoc both in the migrant receiving and sending countries, although hundreds of thousands of migrants did lose work. Many returned home after 1973, thereby compounding the unemployment problems of countries of emigration.

Western European governments were freer to do something about illegal migration which, as most starkly evident in the French case summarized in Table 1, already was extensive before the recruitment curbs. Most European governments enacted or reinforced employer sanctions. Table 2 summarizes key
features of laws adopted to curb illegal employment of aliens as of 1990. Many also authorized legalization programs, as summarized in Table 3. While strategies to curb illegal migration have had limited, positive results, as illegal immigration almost certainly would have been far more extensive in their absence, illegal immigration to Western Europe has proven to be durable, if not intractable. It persists in part because of the extensive familial and village networks between migrant sending and receiving countries that were forged during the recruitment era.

It persists as well because governments allocate insufficient resources to enforcement of laws prohibiting illegal employment of aliens. Legalization policies generally succeed in adjusting the status of only a fraction of the illegal alien population in part because these migrants fear public authorities and live at the margins of society.

The persistence and perhaps proliferation of illegal immigration nearly two decades after the recruitment curbs certainly has contributed to the growing salience of immigration issues in Western Europe. Four additional factors also contributed.

The implementation of the Single European Act, which aims to eliminate barriers to the movement of goods, capital, labor and services, entails lessening of formalities and controls at "internal" frontiers between EC members states. Border control is an important component of immigration regulation, so the Act has raised fears that member states will become even more permeable to, as Boehning (1990) has termed them, "unwanted" international migrants. As the Treaty of Rome does not apply to immigration regulation per se, these fears appear misplaced, but they have served to heighten apprehensions over immigration. The francais moven, for example, fears that implementation will result in Germany's Turks descending upon France. Thus far, implementation of the Act has not directly affected resident aliens in EC member states whose legal status remains unchanged.

The second additional factor has been the political transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. The elimination of many barriers to travel, freedom of emigration, and even the devolution of existing nation-states combined with political instability and looming economic disaster in the former Warsaw Bloc
Table 1 - Evolution of Legalization Rate of Foreign Workers

(Excluding Algerians and Some Others)\(^a\) Admitted as

Permanent Workers to France by the National Immigration Office 1948 to 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent Legalized</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent Legalized</th>
</tr>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>79.4</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>77.2</td>
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</tr>
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\(^a\) Calculation based on all permanent foreign workers admitted to France (save for Algerians) until 1968 from 1969, members of EC states not included. Until 1975, most Black Africans not included.

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Legal Basis</th>
<th>Fine</th>
<th>Imprisonment</th>
<th>Cancellation of Recruitment</th>
<th>Payment of Deportation Transportation Costs</th>
<th>Closure of Business</th>
<th>Penalties for Violation of Social Laws (Health, Accident, Pension Ins.)</th>
<th>Penalties for Illegal Alien Employment in Leasing &amp; Temporary Work</th>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>Aliens Police Law Social Insurance Act</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Fines of 4,000 to 20,000 Fr. for repeat offenders and/or two to six mos. imprisonment for hiring illegal alien temp. worker of for leasing</td>
<td>Provision of false information to authorities punishable by fine and imprisonment up to 6 mos.</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Law of July 22, 1976</td>
<td>1,000 to 2,000 Bel. Fr. per worker. Max. of 150,000 B. Francs.</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Yes (including family of worker)</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Labor Code Law of Oct. 17, 1981</td>
<td>2,000-20,000/workercourt fine, 40,000 Fr. for repeat, 30,200 Fr. admin. fine per worker.</td>
<td>2 mos. - 1 yr.</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Materials and goods may be seized</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Employment Promotion Act Temporary Employment Act Act to Combat Illegal Employment of 1981</td>
<td>100,000 Marks/worker. Fine may be increased to deter employers.</td>
<td>For employment in conditions worse than German, 3 to 5 yrs. (+ fine)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Up to 3 yrs. and 100,000 fine, up to 5 yrs. in serious cases for leasing illegal aliens, max. fine may be increased.</td>
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*Note: The information provided is a simplified representation of the table and does not include all possible penalties or legal implications associated with the listed sanctions.*
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Legal Basis</th>
<th>Fine and Imprisonment</th>
<th>Penalty for Violation of Social Laws (Health, Acc., Pension Ins.)</th>
<th>Penalty for Illegal Alien Employment in Leasing &amp; Temporary Work</th>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>Basic Law 1346183</td>
<td>Minimum 3 mos.</td>
<td>Use of intermediary office other than Employment Office subject to 2,000 L fine per worker per day of employment.</td>
<td>Violation of Employment Office monopoly fine 100,000 to 1,000,000 L and imprisonment for 15 days to 1 year.</td>
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<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>Regulation of May 12, 1972</td>
<td>Up to 6 months</td>
<td>Use of intermediary office other than Employment Office subject to 2,000 L fine per worker per day of employment.</td>
<td>Violation of Employment Office monopoly fine 100,000 to 1,000,000 L and imprisonment for 15 days to 1 year.</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Foreign Workers Employment Act of 1984 &amp; the Economic Offenses Act</td>
<td>Up to 6 months</td>
<td>Use of intermediary office other than Employment Office subject to 2,000 L fine per worker per day of employment.</td>
<td>Violation of Employment Office monopoly fine 100,000 to 1,000,000 L and imprisonment for 15 days to 1 year.</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>Working Environment Law</td>
<td>Up to 2 years</td>
<td>Use of intermediary office other than Employment Office subject to 2,000 L fine per worker per day of employment.</td>
<td>Violation of Employment Office monopoly fine 100,000 to 1,000,000 L and imprisonment for 15 days to 1 year.</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Law on the Sojourn &amp; Establishment of Aliens 1988</td>
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Sources: Council of Europe, OECD
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<th>Country</th>
<th>CAHAR (CE)</th>
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<th>Vienna-process</th>
<th>OECD</th>
<th>IOM</th>
<th>UNHCR Excom</th>
<th>Informal consultations (IGC)</th>
<th>EC</th>
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Source: IGC, 1992
area to raise the specter of mass migration to the West. This potential is taken very seriously and has contributed to the new found salience of immigration issues at the highest levels of government. There was intense diplomatic activity in Europe during the early 1990s on international migration issues, as summarized by Table 4. A Council of Europe-sponsored meeting in Vienna, for example, essentially told the Central and Eastern Europeans to stay home. An OECD-sponsored meeting in Rome attempted to give new impetus to thinking about connections between international migration and development. As in the United States' case with negotiations over a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico (and Canada), Western European governments have had to think hard about linkages between trade policies and international migration when considering the new architecture of Europe. Immigration has found its way to the heart of diplomatic agendas.

Thirdly, there has been an enormous increase in asylum applications in Western Europe as in other Western democracies. Table 5 provides a summary of available data for the 1983 to 1990 period. In 1992, nearly 450,000 aliens applied for asylum in Germany alone. Most asylum applicants are found to be ineligible for the grant of asylum (acceptance rates are as low as five percent in several Western European states, including Germany, as seen in Table 6), but a majority of asylum-seekers manage to stay on despite being denied asylum. The influx of asylum-seekers has been extremely costly and politically controversial. Although Western European states have markedly increased financial and personnel resources consecrated to asylum adjudication, it still often takes years for applications to be adjudicated and the numbers of asylum-seekers continue to swell. Perceived abuse of asylum has put the credibility of governmental efforts to control immigration on the line. Growing political disaffection is endangering maintenance of adhesion to the refugee conventions which are the cornerstone of international cooperation in refugee affairs. Asylum-seekers, thus, have forced policy makers to grapple with the relationship between international migration and its root causes, which are both exogenous and endogenous.

Increasingly, the asylum-seekers influx has rendered explicit long latent connections between immigration and national security policies. The deployment of Italian and Austrian troops to help staunch
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Legalization Policy</th>
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<td>small-scale and unpublishable administrative legalizations permitted in the 1980s. a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>overtime legalization in 1974. Government has since opposed the option. b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>legalization-like policy through nominative recruitment process until 1973, small-scale, unpublishable legalizations on individual basis for humanitarian reasons thereafter, c officially eschews legalization policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>unpublishable small-scale legalization possible until (around) 1985, on and off legalization policy in 1987 and 1988 (105,000 applicants), major legalization policy in 1990, 204,000 aliens legalized.</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15,000 aliens legalized in 1975, 850 legalized in 1980. d</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>44,000 aliens legalized in 1985/86. Political movement in support of legalization and Spanish-Moroccan negotiations lead to limited reopening of legalization opportunity for Moroccans by 1991. e</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Several hundred aliens legalized in 1976. Government has since eschewed legalization. f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Legalization eschewed, but cases of excessive rigor policy grants legal status to over 10,000 aliens, mainly asylum-seekers denied refugee status, since 1982. g</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Small-scale legalization 1974-1978.</td>
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</table>

a Interview with Ambassador Erich Kussbach, April 1991.4
b Commissariat royal _ politque des immigr_s, Pour une cohabitation harmoniease, p. 760.

c Interview with Walter Riess, Federal Ministry of Labor, November 1981.

d C. Wihtol de Wenden, "The absence of rights..." in Z. Lagton-Henrz; The Rights of Migrant Workers, pp. 38-49.


f Interview with Tomas Hammar.

g Office F_d_rale de l'industrie, des arts et m_tiers et du travail and Office f_d_rale des estrangers, Rapport sur la conception et les priorit_s de la politique suisse des estrangers pour les annees 90, p. 46.
Table 5

<table>
<thead>
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<td>61,000</td>
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<td>185,400</td>
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<td>215,800</td>
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Table 6 - Asylum-seekers Recognized as Refugees in Germany 1979-1990 (%)

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

influxes of asylum-seekers are widely known. However, it is scenarios like the possible coming to power of Islamic fundamentalists in North African countries leading to a massive outflow of refugees and migrants with residency rights who have opted to return home that has contributed to the new salience of immigration concerns in foreign policy. Several decades ago, most European leaders would have scoffed at the notion that there was a connection between immigration and national security policies.

Lastly, the politicization of immigration issues in domestic politics has become so extensive and critical that governments must attach priority to anything that affects the issue. This process is perhaps best illustrated by the French case, although France is not the only Western European polity where immigration is the most contentious issue in domestic politics.

Most scholars would concur that immigration was not an important domestic political issue in France prior to 1970 (Withol de Wenden, 1988). Its significance was latent. During the 1970s, however, a variety of factors related to immigrant settlement, such as strikes, housing issues and the growing affirmation of Islam, transformed immigration from a fait divers into an issue which suddenly obligated political parties to hire experts and make policy statements. The growth of the anti-immigrant and anti-semitic National Front, which scored its first break through in 1983, has ensured immigration issues prominence ever since (Gaspard, 1990).

There are severe integration issues facing countries like France. That is why immigration control is seen as the prerequisite to integration. Two decades of integration policies, however, have not adequately resolved the problems of poor housing, unemployment, discrimination and educational barriers that affect immigrants disproportionately (Commission of the European Communities, 1990; Zengers de Beijl, 1990). Table 7 reveals the disproportional growth of alien unemployment in Germany in the 1980s, a situation that was illustrative of a broader pattern and one which contrasted sharply with the situation that obtained during the recruitment era when alien unemployment was low. Hence, it is small wonder that governments have come to view the connection between foreign policy and immigration as vitally important to them. Elections are increasingly affected by immigration issues. Governments and parties attract or lose support on them.
Table 7

Unemployed Workers (Annual Average) in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Foreigners number</th>
<th>Foreigners %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>876,137</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>93,499</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>888,900</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>107,400</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,271,574</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>168,492</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,833,244</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>245,710</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>2,258,235</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>292,140</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,265,559</td>
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<td>270,265</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,304,014</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>253,195</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2,228,004</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>248,001</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2,228,788</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>262,097</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The recent history of migration in Europe raises immediate and serious questions about the utility of realism. Though one might well expect issues that involve the movement of millions of people across international borders to gain the attention of nation-states, the nature of the phenomena and the manner in which it has manifested itself seem contradictory to many of the fundamental tenants of realism. The "opponents" in this context are not nation-states at all, state power has been subverted, no notion of balance or military force appears to have great utility in explaining or solving the problems that have arisen, and change has emerged from areas quite unrelated to traditional "high politics" concerns. Indeed Morgenthau (1968:495) argues against the likelihood of world government specifically on the grounds that nation-states are unlikely to allow large-scale migration. While world government has not emerged, massive migration has. Contrary to the claims of the realists, immigration has become very much a matter of "high" politics.

**Migration, Interdependence, and Neo-Realism:**

Is there a Migration Regime?

Several of the favorite concepts of the interdependence and neo-realist approaches appear relevant in the study of international migration. International migration has forged complex and extensive political and socio-economic linkage structures which have eluded state attempts at control. Trade policies and bilateral relations with neighboring countries have been directly affected. So too have broader international structures. A debate over the existence or lack thereof of a regime for immigration exists (Compare Miller and Zolberg in Kritz et. al. eds., 1992:300-334). In order to assess the utility of interdependence and neo-realism as perspectives by which to understand immigration we must review these various issues.

Trade policy greatly affects immigration policies. If countries like France or the US put up tariff walls to protect agricultural interests, say labor-intensive production of fruits and vegetables, they are reducing employment opportunities in nearby Third World areas, creating large numbers of emigrants and almost certainly encouraging the illegal immigration which they officially want to curb. Due in no small part to the incoherence of many immigration policies, international migration has attained a certain degree of
autonomy from governmental regulation. Indeed the lack of coherence of governmental immigration policies in the 1990s is a severe challenge to any conceptualization of international relations that rests on assumptions of sovereignty or rational and unified state behavior. Bilateral relations between the US and Mexico are directly affected by this very problem (Kiser and Kiser, 1979).

From the perspective of interdependence and neo-realism, it is important to look for regime behavior in areas like migration. The notion of an international regime has been defined broadly and narrowly. Usage of the concept is inconsistent. Broadly speaking, an international regime exists in its strongest sense when states are constrained by explicit or implicit norms, agreements, tacit understandings or treaty commitments in an issue area (Krasner, 1983). States voluntarily and regularly renounce some of their prerogatives in order to adhere to standards of conduct. Their policies and behavior mesh with a regional or international pattern that is perceived as constraining policy options in a given issue area.

The notion of international regimes does have utility as regards the study of international migration as it helps one understand the constraints upon the prerogatives of many governments on certain migration-related matters. There have been relatively few studies of the role of bilateral agreements and the role of international organizations in regulation of international migration. However, there is a long history there even if many specialists in immigration are unaware of it or regard it as unimportant. A state like Switzerland, for example, had signed scores of establishment agreements prior to World War I. Currently, a plethora of multi-lateral and bilateral agreements are constraining the exercise of Swiss sovereignty in regulation of international migration (Office federal de l'industrie, des arts et metiers et du travail, 1987:75-83).

France also has long viewed bilateral agreements as the normal basis for regulation of labor migration. By 1931, the French government published a tome of its bilateral labor accords (Ministere du Travail, 1931). The interwar predecessor to today's ILO was preparing an international instrument pertaining to regulation of international migration before that effort was cut short by World War II. After the war, the ILO adopted Convention 97 in 1949, which was followed in 1975 by Convention 143, both of which pertained to migrant workers and established norms and guidelines for bilateral regulation of international
labor movements. In the years immediately following World War II, France signed a series of bilateral agreements with Italy which were designed to ensure that international labor recruitment benefitted all parties concerned. It was hoped that bilateral governmental regulation of international migration would curb the abuses and inequities that characterized foreign labor recruitment during the interwar period (Cross, 1983:78-81). Signature of bilateral agreements became the postwar pattern in Western Europe as virtually all foreign labor recruitment was regulated on the basis of such agreements.

Relatively few scholars have examined the workings and effects of these agreements. The 1947 Franco-Italian agreement was undercut by employer resistance to regulation and continued hiring of illegal immigrants. The French government began to legalize the illegally employed Italians which in turn undermined the bilateral agreement. This set the pattern for labor migration to France until at least 1968 (Miller, 1986). The French legal scholar Maurice Flory reviewed France's bilateral labor agreements in the 1970s and concluded that those agreements generally were poorly implemented and that they were asymmetrical, leaving countries of emigration with less influence over regulation of international migration than that of the host governments (Flory, 1979).

Flory's assessment was on the mark, as amply demonstrated by the unilateral nature of the decisions to curb foreign labor recruitment in the early 1970s. However, these accords did provide various protections and rights to foreign workers and their dependents which are key to understanding the postwar evolution of Western European policies towards international migration. There developed a partial international regime pertaining to legally-admitted migrants that very much constrained the prerogatives of sovereign states there. Three examples can briefly illustrate this general pattern.

Prior to 1964, most migrant workers in Switzerland were Italian seasonal workers. They had a very restricted status which required them to return home annually and which made it very difficult for them to attain residency rights which would enable them to bring in their families. Italy was sharply critical of the seasonal workers' legal status and brought various forms of pressure to bear on Swiss authorities to liberalize their policies. This resulted in the 1964 Italo-Swiss labor Agreement which made it significantly easier for Italian seasonal workers to obtain legal residency and then bring in their dependents. Swiss
critics of the 1964 Agreement correctly saw it as transforming Switzerland into an immigration land. Indeed it did (Miller, 1981:67-74).

Today, seasonal workers in Switzerland can qualify for residency if they work thirty-six months over a four year period. In recent years, as seen in Table 8, about 10,000 seasonal workers qualify for legal residency annually. Their status is still the object of domestic and international criticism as seen most readily in the negotiations between Switzerland and the EC over their future relationship. The Swiss government does not and cannot treat seasonal workers as it chooses. Its prerogatives were and are constrained by a combination of norms, diplomatic pressures and formal agreements which have transformed "rotational" seasonal worker policy into one of the principal sources of permanent immigration to Switzerland.

In 1976, the French government suddenly declared a halt on further admission of family members of resident foreign workers from non-EC countries. The government had hoped that the recruitment curbs would reduce the immigrant population. But that hope was frustrated, in part, by continuing familial immigration. Given the widespread currency of the idea that family reunification was caused by the decisions to curb recruitment, which is then inappropriately used to criticize those decisions, it perhaps is worth noting that levels of family reunification actually fell subsequent to the 1974 recruitment curb in France and that growing family immigration probably weighed heavily in the decision to curb (not completely to stop) foreign labor recruitment. At any rate, the governmental decree was rescinded by the Council of State as it contradicted France's explicit engagements in the Franco-Portuguese and Franco-Algerian bilateral agreements. France's treaties have legal precedence and the force of law. Hence, France could not stop legal immigration even if its political and governmental leaders bandied about the term 'immigration stop' (Weil, 1991:107-135). France and other Western European states were constrained to authorize continued family immigration by a combination of bilateral accords, compliance with norms established by international organizations such as the ILO (even if they generally were reluctant to ratify pertinent instruments) and by human rights policies. They could not lambast the Soviet
Table 8
Transformation from Seasonal to Resident Status, 1968-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Change</th>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>7,700</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>9,577</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7,890</td>
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<td>1976</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5,776</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>4,071</td>
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<td>4,788</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>12,592</td>
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Union for non-compliance with family reunification provisions of the Helsinki Accords without risking similar criticism if they were to deny this human right to resident aliens. They could and did throw up administrative barriers to legal family reunification but they could only slow it, not stop it.

Similarly, the German government could not enforce rotation of legally-admitted foreign workers who remained employed. The 1972 Germano-Turkish treaty protected Turkish workers against involuntary return and German courts held that Bavarian state efforts to enforce rotation were contrary to Germany’s international engagements (O’ Brien, 1991:9).

Western European policies towards international migrants have been constrained by a partial international regime. Sovereign states are unable to treat migrants as they may wish. Even denied asylum-seekers possess rights and protections which have frustrated Western European governmental efforts to remove them once adjudication of their cases has ended. These constraints were manifest in the 1991 French government decision to legalize the 100,000 or so déboutés du droit d’asile (persons denied asylum but who have not been repatriated) and in the Swiss policy towards so-called cases of severe administrative rigor. The grant of legal status to thousands of individuals denied asylum in a polity that has eschewed legalization policy, as evidenced by Table 9, is largely unknown but highly noteworthy. French and Swiss authorities generally do not return denied asylum-seekers to their homelands if there is reason to think the individual’s human rights might be jeopardized or if refoulement might contradict engagements made to international instruments with regard to refugees. These policies are not publicized for the obvious reason that to do so might induce even more asylum claims. Clearly, it is difficult to reconcile appreciation of the partial international regime with the "Fortress Europa" of draconian policies towards migrants portrayed by many analysts (Messina, 1990:17-31). While policies towards asylum-seekers are controversial and not above moral reproach, the "Fortress Europa" concept originated in the debate over US-EC trade and even in that realm its usefulness is questionable.

The considerable evolution of resident alien rights over the past twenty years in Western Europe has much to do with this partial international regime. But not all international migrants benefit from it. This
Table 9 - Legalization of Cases of Excessive Rigor in Switzerland 1982-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Total Individuals</th>
<th>Number of whom denied were Asylum Seekers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>390</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>225</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,195</td>
<td>2,589</td>
<td>2,036</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>2,678</td>
<td>1,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5,933</td>
<td>4,879</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Office f.d. rale de l'industrie, des arts et m_tiers et du travail and Office f.d. ral des etrangers, Rapport sur la conception et les priorit_s de la politique suisse des etrangers pour les ann.es 90, p. 46.
can be quickly ascertained by contrasting governmental regulation of migrant labor in the Arab region with such regulation in Western Europe.

States like Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia do treat migrants much as they wish. Scholars like Boudahrain (1985) and Beauge and Roussillon (1988) have long criticized the absence of respect for Arab League and international instruments pertaining to international migration by many Arab states. Since the Gulf crisis of 1990/1991, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have shamelessly evicted hundreds of thousands of migrant workers and their dependents, including many who were long-term, legal residents. The international regime pertaining to international migrants, therefore, is far from global. And it is unlikely that the new U.N. convention pertaining to the rights of all migrants will substantially alter that reality.

The recent history of issues, norms and rules of immigration allow us some basis upon which to assess the ability of interdependence and neo-realist conceptions of international relations to help understand important phenomena. The interdependence framework provides the superior analysis. Immigration appears more as an issue area than a function of global structure. While immigration might be explained with reference to gross inequalities between core and periphery, its salience in relations between Germany and France, as well as the elusive, individualistic and fragmented manner in which policies emerge are more consistent with the general framework of interdependence. Agenda setting and linkage behavior, not structural changes or any level of anarchy better explain the actions that have been taken and the manner in which countries are trying to cope. Regime formation is more relevant than any loss of hegemonic status, and the attributes of change outlined in the interdependence problematique is better able to comprehend change in the nature of migration patterns and coping behaviors than is the more power oriented explanation offered by the neo-realist school.
Migration, Marx, and the World System:
Class Politics and Global Incentive Structures

While interdependence provides us with an analytical tool well suited to the description of contemporary immigration policy, it provides little guidance as to when or why immigration occurs, what its effects may be, or of its future. Both marxian and world system theories make far greater claims to universality than do either interdependence or neo-realism, particularly as regards the vicissitudes of labor. In this section we will review evidence that will allow us to consider what these theories may add to our understanding of this phenomenon.

In contrast to "bourgeois" social science, it is not at all surprising that it would be Marxists who first would realize the tremendous political significance of post-World War II labor migration to Western Europe. As non-citizens, foreign workers were seen as being of little or no significance to political parties, elections, governmental institutions and public policymaking, the traditional foci of non-Marxian students of politics (Aron, 1974). In a conception of political life as class struggle, on the other hand, foreign workers, as part of the productive force, could take on political significance both actively, as participants in strikes, labor union activities and other kinds of "worker struggles," and passively, as a damper on wages and as a source of subjective divisions within the working class.

A primary thrust of Marxist research on migration has been to specify and clarify the foreign workers' role in and impact upon contemporary class conflict in Western Europe. In this effort, certain key concepts in Marxist theory have been applied to the situation of foreign workers thereby providing a theoretical context in which foreign worker experience has been interpreted. Marxists find foreign workers fulfilling the function of a Reserve Industrial Army in contemporary Western European Capitalism. Marx argued that a mass of rural migrants, theoretically inexhaustible, would keep wages at the minimal level necessary for the reproduction of the labor force. Hence, the emiseration of the working class. Given the cyclical nature of capitalism, these rural migrants would be thrown out of work in times of depression, thereby allowing capitalists to temporarily protect their profit margins and cushion themselves from the effects of
the depression. During the period of post-World War II economic expansion, many non-Marxists pointed to the nearly full employment economies of those years as proof that the concept of a Reserve Industrial Army had no basis in fact and that, given the centrality of this concept to Marxist theory, that Marx was wrong.

Marxists quickly pointed to the influx of foreign workers as the twentieth century manifestation of the Marxian Reserve Industrial Army (Gorz, 1970). While Marx himself conceived of the Reserve Industrial Army only in terms of the uprooted peasantry of individual states, the subsequent development of Monopoly Capital was seen as extending the manpower needs of the modern economy beyond the confines of the national state. The near full employment of the French citizenry, thus, did not disprove the notion of a Reserve Industrial Army because now Algerian or Portuguese migration was acting as a restraint on wages and, as indicated by the fate of Turkish workers in Germany during the recession of 1967, there still was a labor force that would be thrown out of work during economic downturns (Martin, 1993). Further, the accentuated exploitation or super-exploitation of the foreign component of the proletariat could explain the relative real income gains of Western Europe workers during this period, thereby providing a defense of the emiseration hypothesis.

Support for the emiseration hypothesis was particularly important in the context of a growing debate on notions of the rise of a labor aristocracy, or the "embourgeoisement" theory, which predicted the passing of the working class into middle class status in advanced industrial societies. For Marx, the notion of a labor aristocracy referred to an element of the working class which, because of its relative prosperity or feeling of superiority, identified with the state and integrated itself into the state apparatus. The social promotion of Western European workers, whether objective or subjective, due to the massive foreign worker immigration, has resulted in an increased tendency toward collaboration between Western European labor and the state apparatus in the post-World War II era. The same outcome may be derived from a review of native worker status. As both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars have pointed out, it has been the replacement of Western European workers with foreign workers that has allowed the social promotion of indigenous workers in the post-World War II era.
Marxists overwhelmingly stressed the numbing effect of migration upon class struggle and, conversely, the importance of migration as a stability factor explaining the maintenance of capitalist dominance in Western Europe. Bernard Granotier perhaps most succinctly expressed the Marxist thesis concerning the political impact of foreign workers. "With the immigration, the bourgeoisie found a new means to try to get around its great political problem: not to dig its own grave, not to multiply its own grave diggers as Marx would put it." According to Granotier, immigration allows the bourgeoisie to "... augment the volume of the working class without augmenting the 'negative', the 'social criticism' within the society" (1973).

Granotier leaves one with an almost Manichean conception of foreign worker political life. Either foreign workers are reduced to the position of virtual twentieth century slaves or else foreign workers represent a revolutionary force that could be a decisive factor in the overthrow of the capitalist order if it were not for the foreign worker condition limiting their political consciousness and forcing any political activity on their part to be clandestine because of the risk of police repression. In this perspective, the scope, variety, and indeed, the importance of actual foreign worker political activities are lost. On the empirical level, there is considerable evidence that foreign workers participate and get representation through these channels (Miller, 1981; Ireland, 1991). Immigrants have in fact become an important source of political opposition and "social criticism" throughout Western Europe. This would indicate that, using Granotier's idiom, migration is a much less effective way for the bourgeoisie to get around its political problem than Granotier would have one believe.

To varying degrees, the works of Granotier and others (Castles and Kosack, Castells, Miles) who wrote on foreign labor in a Marxist vein all reflect the influence of Andre Gorz. Among the well-known contemporary Western European social scientists-philosophers, Sartre's collaborator on Les Temps Modernes was the first to attribute extensive political significance to immigration to Europe. According to Gorz (1970), labor migration assumed political significance because,

"... the absence of such a cheap labor force would make the present patterns of distribution and consumption impossible: were the mass of social outcasts to
disappear or to withhold their labor, capitalism would be obliged to pay all its labor at its historic price, which it would be unable to do without disrupting the system's economic and social balance, its hierarchial structure and civilization."

Equally important were the effects of immigrant labor on domestic working class politics. In Les Temps Modernes he wrote that:

"The massive call upon foreign labor permits a fundamental mental and artificial modification of the political and social structure of the indigenous population. Recourse to foreign workers permits notably: the exclusion of an important part of the proletariat from trade upon activity, to sharply diminish the political and electoral weight of the working class, to diminish more sharply yet its ideological weight and cohesion, in a word, to 'denationalize' decisive sectors of the working installed in residence, with an imported proletariat, economically and politically 'marginalized', deprived of all political, trade union and civic right."

Developments in foreign worker history and changes in the foreign workers' legal status since 1970 notwithstanding, this statement by Gorz is mistaken in important ways. Foreign workers have never been deprived of all trade union rights. Gorz may well be right that foreign labor migration resulted in a fundamental and artificial modification of class politics, and that this modification has been a major factor in the maintenance of capitalist dominance in Western Europe, but these kinds of statements are difficult, if not impossible, to falsify, and therefore have to be accepted or rejected more on the basis of political conviction than on the basis of observation. What Gorz asserts that can be tested, however, is subject to doubt. It would seem to be a clear exaggeration, for example, to argue that foreign workers are deprived of all political and civic rights. Furthermore, his portrayal of foreign workers as sharply diminishing the political weight of the working class leaves one with an impression of immigrant political passivity that is belied by the facts.

Marxists have made a number of advances in our understanding of migration. States regulate or deregulate the flow of foreign workers to serve the interests of those in need of inexpensive and relatively
passive labor. From here, however, Marxists take the road of praxis away from the testing of this or any corollary hypotheses. We are left with excellent explanation, but of only a narrow band of phenomena.

The literature on dependency theory evolved in part from Marxism as considered at the global level. There have been a number of considerations of international migration informed by dependency theory concerns. Adler (1977), for example, sought to test some of the tenets of dependency theory in the Franco-Algerian case. He found dependency theory wanting, though this was due in great part to his very static definition of the concept involved.

Dependency theorists interpret international migration within a broader framework of Western Capitalist domination of subordinate Third World states. Dependency built on Marxist interpretations of class relations and global wage inequality as an underpinning for migration. To this was added a simple explanation of the dominant patterns of migration derived from the history of colonial dominance that struck an immediate cord. Some of the scholarly disagreements over the effects of migrant wage remittances, for example, probably can be traced to the broader disagreement over the cumulative effects of international migration upon Third World development between adherents of a dependency perspective and their critics. Studies of the destruction of local farming precipitated by the migration of rural male labor, or of changes in land tenure, were used to undercut the long dominant dual economy hypothesis, while helping to explain changing patterns of third world agriculture (e.g. Bandarage, 1982). Problems associated with the "brain drain" were also highlighted in this literature (Kritz and Caces, 1992).

Dependency theorists have long viewed persistent or growing inequality in incomes, life chances and employment opportunities as driving forces behind international migration. The deterioration in the terms of trade between North and South, growing poverty, crushing public debt, ecological devastation and political instability in the Third World virtually ensures that there will be far greater international migration in the future than in the past. One is reminded of the late Algerian President Boumedienne's observation that not even nuclear weapons will be able stop the poor from traveling North. Unfashionable as it might now be, dependency theory shed light on the root causes of international migration that will determine flows in the future as well.
The 1991 OECD meeting in Rome signaled the beginning of a new chapter in the history of social science research into the effects of international migration upon development. Subsequent ILO hosting of a conference on strategies of immigration-abatement through development also suggested that the immigration-development nexus will be a major focus of research in the coming decade. The dependency theory critique of international migration, linked as it is to a broader Marxist tradition in the throes of crisis, is on the defensive just at the time when many of its insights seem most penetrating. The awareness that the future of international migration to Europe and elsewhere will be shaped by global developments owes a considerable debt to dependency theory.

Only time will tell whether the Western democracies are better able to address those root causes through measures like development policies targeted at immigration abatement. Past experience warrants pessimism and it is known that one of the paradoxical effects of development is to generate additional migration over the short to medium term. The new salience of immigration issues in Western Europe in particular will perhaps give rise to a long overdue sense of realism. So-called North/South issues have too long been viewed from the angle of altruism and humanitarianism when problems attendant to regulation of international migration have long suggested that Western democracies have a profound self-interest in the socio-economic and political development of Third World countries. International migration has expanded enormously since the 1970s, although no one is certain how much, because of population growth, improved transportation and communication, the spread of Western cultural influences to the remotest corners of the world and so on. But factors like huge wage differentials between Western democracies and the Third World along with huge inequalities in per capita incomes and life chances make it more challenging to explain why it is that most inhabitants of the Third World stay home rather than trying their luck abroad. Wage differentials for agricultural work between metropolitan France and Algeria have not changed much since the colonial epoch. Until they do, France and the EC's immigration control strategy must be viewed as less than comprehensive.

Dependency theory evolved into world systems analysis as scholars expanded their analysis of global change to include not only the periphery but the core as well. Only a few authors have worked to apply
world system analysis to the global immigration and refugee phenomena. Although Zolberg (1978) uses the term in the title of a 1978 work, his explicit adoption of the state as the most relevant unit of analysis for understanding patterns of immigration suggests a different emphasis (Zolberg, 1989). Portes and Walton (1981) present the most impressive introduction to immigration from a world system perspective. The pattern of immigration is explained with reference to the history of core penetration of peripheral areas and the inherent relations of power that have existed since. The atomistic assumptions of neo-classical liberals are therefore avoided and the actual distribution of senders and receivers is easy to explain. This is true both at the global level, where world system work builds on the dependency school, and in terms of regional analysis, where sets of closely related areas may be analyzed in more specific terms (Portes and Walton, 1981).

The tendency of peripheral areas to provide migrants is reinforced by the hyperurbanization characteristic of non-core areas of the world system. Access to greater information about alternative economic endeavors, and greater proximity to cheap and plentiful transportation provide inducements. The enhanced incorporation of the workers of peripheral areas into the labor forces of core areas has garnered much attention, as in the works of Sassen. Migration is further encouraged by the denial of remunerative employment in a formal sector of the domestic peripheral economy. This helps explain the status and background of the majority of modern immigrants. Finally, local elites find the sending of portions of their populace overseas useful for a number of reasons. Surpluses of unemployed require outlets, and migration may have the added benefit of impressing upon core areas the need for development assistance. Wage remittances may help assuage local poverty and contribute to the balance of payments. Hence the domestic setting for immigration is often assured.

World system analysis makes use of the concept of the global division of labor to provide a basis for understanding the reasons for core acquiescence to large-scale immigration as well. The sticky wage and large benefit packages of organized core labor reduce the flexibility of owners of capital in the face of economic cycles. As modern technology and management procedures produce a growing discrepancy between those positions which pay a socially acceptable wage and provide chances for advancement, and
jobs engineered to require little talent and limited future prospects, the need for a population willing to accept positions of the latter sort is increased. Hence during both upswings, when competition for labor may be forcing wages up, and downswings, when low wages and flexibility is at a premium, migrant labor will be in demand. This may well explain why levels of migration have ceased to respond to business cycles. World system authors have also described at length the globalization of production. As capital and jobs flow to lower wage areas, the desire for protection from competition at home and abroad is enhanced. Working class acquiescence to the Single Market Act, as well as growing resentment toward immigrant labor, are among the relevant phenomena that become more easily understood in this light.

IV. LESSONS FOR STUDENTS OF WORLD POLITICS

The broad-scale existence of immigration, its patterns and effects all provide information relevant to the assessment of competing theories of world politics. Realism, with its emphasis on the unified, rational and defensible nation-state, fares poorly. Immigration laws more often reflect an ad hoc array of the results of contending perspectives than any coherent body of policy. Efforts to effect comprehensive reforms of immigration policies have fallen short for various reasons, including the rapacity of powerful interest groups. Controls, even at borders, have been deficient and porous, although democratic states do possess a limited capacity to prevent unwanted migration. This largely latent capacity has been tapped in instances where national security interests are viewed as greatly affected by the ability to prevent "unwanted" entry. Israel is a case in point.

Generally, however, traditional sources of power, along with traditional avenues of diplomacy, have thus far appeared ill-equipped to cope with the challenge of international migration. Some democracies, like the United Kingdom, for reasons of geography and policy, appear less porous and more in control than others, say France or Germany. It certainly is erroneous to contend that purposive state policies have zero or little effect on international immigration as some scholars are wont to conclude. Still, the gap between stated immigration control policies, such as the U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, and
their successful implementation is such as to raise serious doubts about realism.

Interdependence fares better. Its focus on specific issue areas, on sub-national (and often contentious) policy making units, and on the need to define power in a contextual manner proves far more consistent with the parameters of contemporary global migration. Regimes do form, and policies do converge in response to the more homogeneous effects of global change. But the liberal reliance on notions of atomistic economic rationality preclude a deeper analysis of migration patterns. Notions of liberal economic institution-building and the embedding of rights in all sectors of the economy also lead to unwarranted conclusions. (See, for example, Hollifield, 1992, and the review by Miller, 1993.)

Neo-realisists face the worst shortcomings of both realism and interdependence. Belief in the coherent, rational nation-state remains untenable, while the regimes they expect to rise or decline based on the relative position of a hegemonic power tell us nothing about immigration past or present.

Marxists also suffer from their adoption of the national state as their relevant boundary. Class analysis provides a strong basis for understanding both the contentious nature of immigration policy, as well as its generally dominant thrust. From there Marxist theory often turns to questions of the immediate effects on working class politics. It sheds light on immigrant patterns, cycles, and alternative policy futures. Marxists, for instance, correctly predicted that migrants disproportionally bear the brunt of unemployment in recessionary cycles, although many migrants still chose to stay on in Western Europe after 1973. Table 10, for instance, reveals a sharp and disproportional drop in alien employment in the French auto and construction industries in the 1970s. By the early 1980s, a variety of statistical sources indicated that three out of every four jobs being lost in the French building industry were held by foreigners, although aliens comprised less than a third of the industry’s workforce. A mechanistic interpretation of the function of the Reserve Industrial Army concept in the 1973 to 1980 era accords poorly with the facts. But the essential insights, that immigration policy is shaped in great part by competing class interests, and that migrants will bear the brunt of economic downturns, is borne out empirically.
**TABLE 10**

TOTAL SALARIED EMPLOYEES AND FOREIGN SALARIED EMPLOYEES
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR IN 1973, 1976 AND 1979*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Automobile Construction</th>
<th>Construction, Civil Engineering &amp; Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Aliens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>507,900</td>
<td>125,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>527,100</td>
<td>104,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>520,900</td>
<td>96,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on a Ministry of Labor survey of firms employing ten or more persons. Such firms employ 80.3% of total employees in the industrial and commercial sectors.

(Source: Travail et Emploi, No. 8, April - June, 1981, p. 53.)
World system theory emerges from this review in the best position. The global level of analysis allows for a serious review of immigration patterns through a careful analysis of the integration of various sectors of labor into the world system. An explicit understanding of core dominance and exploitation over the periphery help explain why conditions in both core and periphery have become increasingly conducive to migration. At the same time, the study of the requisites of accumulation allows us to understand policy debates and helps make sense of apparently inconsistent political positions and policy outcomes both within core states and in core-periphery relations. World system analysis does not deny the importance of the national state as a mechanism for political organization, yet its broader level of analysis provides a solid foundation for both regional and global considerations of phenomena that are obviously affected by, and that in turn affect, global politics. It should be no surprise that recent works on immigration call for the adoption of a "migration systems" approach. Students of world politics should take note.

V. LESSONS FOR STUDENTS OF MIGRATION

If the world system perspective offers the best fit of the various theories of world politics, what is it that students of migration can learn from the perspective? World systems analysis is still in its intellectual infancy. At barely 20 years of age, it has precious little to offer in the realm of specifics. Four general suggestions are offered.

Increasing Immigration

First, it should be noted that immigration is likely to continue its increase. Currently, only a tiny minority of the globe's population, perhaps two percent, lives "abroad." Other schools would predict possible downward trends in the level of immigration based on changes in state policies, alterations in hegemonic power, regime formation, and class conflict. From a world system perspective such an outcome is possible, but unlikely. Though debates within the world system camp have centered on just how long ago we can identify a truly global world system, nearly all agree that the current age is one of unprecedented levels of communication and transportation. Levels of global inequality are also at historic proportions, and they are growing both within and between countries. These phenomena sustain high
levels of immigration and enhance its growth. The "immigration crisis" declared by the U. N. Population Fund in June of 1993 is something more than a public relations ploy.

This continuing increase will likely force European states to take additional action on immigration. Legalization may be a first step, but past legalizations have been incomplete and evidence suggests that they attract additional illegal inflows. Nearly all European democracies have legal immigration policies for family members of legally resident aliens and citizens. But not all offer options consistent with the nature and extent of migration they have experienced to date. Slogans like 'Germany is not an immigration land' have long made little sense. Now some argue that the solution to illegal immigration is to adopt immigration quotas. Such a measure would be adaptive in that there already are legal provisions for entry by entitled family members, some refugees and various foreigners, like highly skilled workers. But the U.S. experience demonstrates that the existence of a generous legal immigration program (nearly two million resident aliens admitted in 1991) does not preclude significant inflows of other kinds of migrants.

Establishment of legal immigration quotas would be a helpful step. But it is unrealistic to think that it will significantly attenuate perceived problems of "unwanted" inflows. There is precious little political support for the limited legal admission that currently exists, and in places like Germany even that is in retreat. European states will be forced by the numbers involved to try to come to terms with migration, even if that task seems impossible.

The size, strength, and importance of global migration underpins long-standing criticisms of theories like realism that define the study of international relations along the narrow terms of balancing the military forces of potential competitors for dominance. Migration is well on the way to becoming a "security" issue, and this well illustrates that narrow conceptualizations of world politics are simply untenable. For the most part, this is a positive development in that it invites reflection on linkages between migration and other issues in international relations such as arms sales and the handling of regional conflicts. But this also places an additional onus on the makers of immigration policy. The extreme right has long argued that masses of "unwanted" aliens are a threat to national security. That
position is gaining additional attention. The growth of global migration is placing additional stresses on nation-states at the most fundamental possible levels.

A System Level Phenomena

The second lesson that the world system perspective offers is that migration must be understood as a system level, not an individual level economic phenomenon. The masses of refugees created by wars in the Middle East or Europe may be seen as victims of desires for greater control over oil revenues or of the highly unfortunate overlapping of economic and ethnic differences. The only realistic, long-term solution to the perceived problem of "unwanted" international migration is sustainable socio-economic growth. This was obvious by 1970 and is periodically confirmed by a variety of commissions. Liberalization of trade between core democracies and the periphery can sometimes spur growth. But that may actually increase international migration over the short to medium term. Western governments must act to enable zones of emigration to develop viable export markets. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) approach should help reduce "unwanted" migration from Mexico to the U.S. over the long run, but it will not do so in the short term. Freedom of labor movement was specifically excluded from NAFTA proposals because it would have killed the Agreement politically. As it is, ratification by the U.S. Congress is by no means assured given the negative sentiments that gained strength in the 1992 presidential and legislative elections.

Trade liberalization within blocs may serve to slow migration among the membership, but can adversely affect economic relations with other immigrant producing areas outside the bloc. Tunisia, for instance, was adversely affected when Spain and Portugal joined the EC. Trade liberalization can help abate unwanted international migration over the long run. But trade policies are sensitive to political pressure and there is little reason to be optimistic about significant liberalization in the wake of the stalled Uruguay Round and continued G-7 disagreements over financial and monetary policies.

Students of the world system are always looking for the effects of the periodic cycles of the global economy. While migration may serve interests both on the upswing and downswing, it is nevertheless
possible that cycles may become evident in the popular political response or in terms of policymaking. The world system school would encourage students of migration to begin to look for a variety of such cycles.

The Untenability of Unilateralism

Third, unilateral attempts at establishing policy to deal with the challenges posed by immigration are likely to fail. Individual states may certainly affect immigration, but the costs of going it alone will be prohibitively high, and may easily be wasted. Successful policies will have to be bi-lateral or multi-lateral, reflecting the nature of the problem.

There is significant prospect for abatement of unwanted international migration through bilateral cooperation. Domestic control policies in Western European democracies depend to a degree upon bilateral cooperation. Ultimately, immigration control strategies rest on the ability to prevent unlawful entry by aliens or deportation of aliens who succeed in entering and then violate immigration laws. If European states are to be able to use deportation as a viable sanction, they require the cooperation of the governments of states from which the individuals in question came. Cooperation from countries presumed to be the relevant homelands is not always forthcoming. It can be induced through a variety of means, including the provision of humanitarian assistance and through linkage to legal immigration policies.

Governments of societies which send large numbers of emigrants to Western Europe are less likely to view these migrants as "unwanted." The term masks powerful inducements to illegal migration generated within Western European societies. The tendency from without is to view all migration as wanted despite restrictive formal policies. While migrant-sending countries are sensitive to treatment of their nationals abroad, they quite naturally are reluctant to assume that Western European migration policies are blameless on the issue of illegal migration. From the perspective of many of the countries of emigration, the problem is not too much immigration but too few legal immigration possibilities.

Hence, linkage of a full palette of migration policy concerns is the rule rather than the exception. Bilateral cooperation on migration issues is fostered through generous legal immigration policies. However, perceived laxity in immigration matters, say overstaying of temporary visitor visas, fuels political reaction to government policies. Very real political constraints reduce the options of European states, making the
balance between domestic and foreign policy concerns in migration policymaking elusive. Nonetheless, there would appear to be many ways to foster bilateral cooperation through linkage politics.

The surge in diplomatic activity on migration questions primarily involves groping for multilateral or regional approaches to issues too long viewed in a unilateral way. A multilateral approach in no way diminishes the sovereignty of independent states. It represents adaptation to the complexities of the global system. All Western democracies, including those in Europe, must approach migration issues as regional questions if headway is to be made. The permeability of liberal democratic states and their position in the global socio-economic, legal and political system is the fundamental explanation of this.

If progress in the abatement of unwanted international migration is to be made, it must come primarily through this approach. The soaring number of international meetings on migration issues suggests that migration issues are being taken far more seriously than in the past. This is hopeful, though it is no guarantee of success.

The track record of European democracies on multilateral cooperation in the area of migration is not particularly encouraging. Even the much acclaimed Dublin Agreement concerning adjudication of asylum-seeker claims within the EC has been frustrated by Germany’s Article 16, (which finally was amended in 1993 after a long debate). Still, everyone recognizes now that European migration policies increasingly will be shaped in EC and other European fora. There are those who argue that the different policy and historical traditions affecting various European states’ migration policies are creating greater divergence rather than convergence (Manfrass, 1992). These very real differences may limit and impair the cohesion seemingly required to address Europe’s many migration issues. However, viewed from across the Atlantic, convergence is more striking than divergence. In particular, the transformation of Greece, Spain and Portugal into significant immigration lands has obviated the former distinction made between the European North and South in the realm of immigration. They are all now countries of immigration.

A high-ranking German Federal Ministry of Labor official once complained that the key policymaking problem in the immigration policy area stems from the Janus-faced nature of the issue itself. It is extraordinarily complex and complicated, yet is addressed and apprehended in simplistic ways. It is
meaningless to talk about two, five or ten steps to prevent unwanted international migration when one or two hundred coordinated steps would in fact be necessary. All governments, including those in Europe, need to develop systematic and coordinated policies on immigration. The effects of policies on international migration need to be evaluated like policies are evaluated for environmental impact in some countries. Few high marks could be awarded to governments for the coherency of their public policies, but here the new salience attached to immigration concerns again augers well.

Migration as Cause and Effect

A forth and final suggestion that world system perspective offers is perhaps the least encouraging. Core-periphery differentiation and inter-core contradictions appear to be long term attributes of the mix of nation-states that make up the world system. These lead to periodic crises. International migration fundamentally affects, and is fundamentally affected by, both of these processes. It therefore appears as both a major cause and effect of world political disorder. This is particularly true in Europe, with its post-war history of growing immigration amidst the policy muddle. This need not be the case. Governments do have a capacity to influence international migration in a coherent and humane manner. How tractable the issue is depends on a host of variables, a number of which have been identified here. One of the few certainties is that a high level of international migration to Western Europe will continue. The quality of leadership offered will greatly determine whether these flows contribute to or impair international security and cooperation in the European area.
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